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Large v State of Wyoming

Case No. S-11-0068 (WY S.Ct., Nov. 30, 2011)

The appellant, Jeramie John Edwin Large, was charged with six crimes arising from an incident when he stole and crashed a vehicle. In this appeal he claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that he was denied his right to counsel without being adequately instructed and warned of the dangers of proceeding without counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.

ISSUES



1. Whether the appellant received a speedy trial.

2. Whether the district court properly informed the appellant of the dangers of proceeding without counsel and the penalties he faced.

FACTS



A felony information charging the appellant with burglary, larceny, interference with a police officer, failure to provide personal information after a vehicular accident, and failure to give notice of an accident to police, was filed against the appellant on October 2, 2009. That same day, the appellant executed an affidavit requesting court-appointed counsel and an order appointing a public defender was entered. In the affidavit, the appellant wrote, “Rep[resent] myself w[ith] stand in counsel.” Also, on October 2, 2009, the appellant waived his preliminary hearing.

Ten days after the appellant completed his application for appointed counsel, but before his arraignment, the public defender’s office moved to vacate its appointment because the appellant “wrote on [the affidavit] that he would represent himself ‘with stand in counsel’.” Shortly thereafter, but before arraignment, the appellant filed handwritten pro se motions asking the district court for, among other things, a separation of the charges, full discovery, and medical care.
 

 

Judge(s): Barton Voigt
Jurisdiction: Wyoming Supreme Court
Related Categories: Criminal Justice
 
Supreme Court Judge(s)
James Burke
Michael Golden
William Hill
Marilyn Kite
Barton Voigt

 
Trial Court Judge(s)
Steven Cranfill

 
Appellant Lawyer(s) Appellant Law Firm(s)
Diane Lozano Office of the Wyoming State Public Defender
Tina Olson Office of the Wyoming State Public Defender
David Westling Office of the Wyoming State Public Defender

 
Appellee Lawyer(s) Appellee Law Firm(s)
Terry Armitage Office of the Wyoming Attorney General
Michael Pauling Office of the Wyoming Attorney General
Gregory Phillips Office of the Wyoming Attorney General
Stewart Young University of Wyoming College of Law

 

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due to the [appellant] acting as his own attorney by filing motions on his own an appointment at that point unless the appellant waived his right to a speedy [26] regarding the first factor, we have said: whether the appellant received a speedy trial. factors inasmuch as we have found shorter delays to warrant such. see [31] in this second issue, the appellant asserts that the district court failed to notice: this opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in pacific 2010, the district court heard that motion and another motion by the public for clear error." sisneros v. state, 2005 wy 139, 16, 121 p.3d 790, 797 (wyo. appointed counsel; [the appellant] has requested he attorney and works at cross purposes with [the appellant's] counsel's trial . . . the defendant has clearly been advised of his right 24. any delays attributable to the state are weighed against those attributable trial, wyoming law requires suspension of all criminal proceedings until the essential to a broad understanding of the case. the district court told the appellant that before it would allow him to represent [15] at the court's request, the prosecutor then outlined the substance of all six of anything that might prevent him from understating the court's advice and delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of [his or her] right; and the appellant's request to represent himself with standby counsel, and the public [35] we conclude that the appellant was afforded a speedy trial as it occurred this advice. see supra 14. the district court concluded clearly and on the 2007 wy 66, 9, 156 p.3d 986, 990 (wyo. 2007) (762 days); berry, 2004 wy 1200, 117 l.ed.2d 440 (1992) (some citations behalf without conferring with counsel." counsel also informed the district court the honorable steven r. cranfill, judge omitted). the district court's failure to conduct a (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the "would be happy" representing himself. he then stated, "i'm definitely not was long, it was not extraordinary. see id. at 11, at 349 (2,971 days); [2] 1. whether the appellant received a speedy trial. formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent constitution." walters v. state, 2004 wy 37, 9, 87 p.3d 793, 795 (wyo. 2004) u.s. at 532, 92 s.ct. at 2193. "of these, the most serious is the last, because his own attorney. appellant was tried within the required 180 days. 2004 wy 81, 32, 93 p.3d [222,] 231 [(wyo. 2004)]. representing appellee: executed an affidavit requesting court-appointed counsel and an order appointing [the appellant] is not open to any counseling or waiving my speedy trial, and i'll represent myself if so be needed. . . . i want to [13] the next day, the district court heard counsel's motion to vacate his a demand for a speedy trial. then, on july 21, 2010, he filed a handwritten pro 2004). "the district court's findings of fact on the speedy trial issue are reviewed [25] we turn now to the constitutionally imposed speedy trial requirements. to the appellant that he had placed his attorney in a difficult position and had reporter third. readers are requested to notify the clerk of the supreme court, appellant. w.r.cr.p. 48 specifically excluded from the speedy trial computation for his legal research. l.ed.2d 101 (1972) "set forth the benchmark test that applies to the constitutional does so competently and intelligently." (quoting godinez v. moran, 509 u.s. 389, test, we cannot say that the delay in this case violated the appellant's sixth claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that he was denied his appellant] has continued to file motions with the case number: no. s-11-0068 complete file, discovery," "motion requesting public defenders," and a request [22] in addition to the delays caused by the appellant's efforts to change defendant's] background and conduct, demonstrate counsel," stating permissible punishments, and any additional facts sisneros, 2005 wy 139, 19, 121 p.3d at 797 (found 349 days to meet the counsel and orally moved to withdraw as counsel. based on the state hospital's district court can make a determination of the defendant's mental competency." inaccurate. as noted above, the district court cautioned the appellant that it the entire system." barker, 407 u.s. at 532, 92 s.ct. at 2193. the appellant the appellant was responsible for the majority, if not all, of the delay. see supra constitution. also, we conclude that the appellant's right to counsel was not "unquestionably, delays attributable to the defendant may disentitle him to boucher v. state, 2011 wy 2, 10, 245 p.3d 342, 349 (wyo. 2011). in the april 14, 2010, which date resulted in a delay less than the 180 days prescribed [36] we affirm. ability to investigate." such difficulties, however, are not the result of any delay in defender then noted that the appellant had informed him that he would like other including "complications of misrepresentation by public defenders [sic] office on of an arraignment, and argues that the actual arraignment had to be delayed until prejudice in light of the particular evils the speedy trial right is intended to avert: the prejudice to the defendant. . . . none of these factors alone are dispositive." pro se." vargas v. state, 963 p.2d 984, 990 (wyo. 1998). dangers of proceeding without counsel and the penalties he faced. between arraignment and trial; however, delays between the time of charge and appointed counsel. however, he did so while at the same time making a jeramie john edwin large v. the state of wyoming [33] the appellant asserts that he "in no sense voluntarily waived counsel, cite as: 2011 wy 159, __ p.3d __ before kite, c.j., and golden, hill, voigt, and burke, jj. vehicular accident, and failure to give notice of an accident to police, was filed arraignment, the appellant filed handwritten pro se motions asking the district to the defendant. strandlien, 2007 wy 66, 10, 156 p.3d at 991. right to counsel without being adequately instructed and warned of the dangers indication that he'd like to represent himself." the appellant stated that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. "we examine de novo the constitutional right to assistance, including his right to the medical care. verdict on the interference with a police officer charge. the appellant timely [16] a jury trial commenced on september 27, 2010, and ended the next day. appealed his convictions. speedy trial safeguards." berry, 2004 wy 81, 35, 93 p.3d at 232. while no the risks of proceeding pro se. prosecution, but instead, as explained by the district court, are problems inherent the state of wyoming, ask that one be appointed. the court cautioned, however, that it would permit no consistent and seemingly calculated effort to undermine the efforts of his court- argument by mr. westling. single factor is dispositive, we find that under the particular facts presented here, [10] the district court took the competency evaluation request under continues from the time of arraignment through sentencing." id. (citing godinez, instructed the appellant on the dangers of proceeding without counsel and he sixth amendment." berry v. state, 2004 wy 81 17, 93 p.3d 222, 227 (wyo. that matter prior to arraignment. follet v. state, 2006 wy 47, 8, 132 p.3d asking numerous times for appointment of a new attorney. the record is replete appointment of counsel to represent you to assist with your defense." wyo. stat. ann. 7-6-107 (lexisnexis 2011) specifically states that a person who elects to id. (internal citations omitted). suggesting that self-representation was the only option that would allow him to that the appellant had resumed filing motions without informing counsel or that any defense may be interposed on his behalf." the court then arraigned the appellant (defendant), advisement and on february 3, 2010, issued an order finding "that wyoming appellant requested appointment of a different attorney. all three of the attorneys that he would be held to the same standard as an attorney. the appellant jeramie john edwin large, again placed the court "in the situation of finding someone else to represent [4] ten days after the appellant completed his application for appointed to report; however, he was acquitted of larceny and the jury could not reach a speedy trial: once in his own handwritten motion, and once through his third [24] the delays in the proceedings are attributable almost exclusively to the decided: 11/30/2011 consecutively. the appellant again stated that he understood. at that point, the the appellant's decision to waive his right to counsel and represent himself. the the appellant then explained why he had filed some of his motions, asserting, "i purpose. the appellant's trial began on september 27, 2010, which would have proceed to trial without additional delay. the district court agreed that appointing possesses the intelligence and the capacity to however, a public defender advised that the appellant had recently "resubmitted defendant in state court shall have the right to represent himself if the accused and does not do so to cause delay." hauck, 2001 wy 119, 16, 36 p.3d at 601- 81, 34, 93 p.3d at 232 (720 days); warner v. state, 2001 wy 67, 12, 28 p.3d a lawyer," to which the appellant responded, "i'd like to proceed . . . and just set it [6] at an arraignment hearing on october 28, 2009, some confusion arose as withdraw had "been filed partly on the request of [the appellant] making that [19] the appellant argues that we should construe the hearing on october 28, cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 u.s. 1106, 112 s.ct. shortly thereafter, but before the appellant was found guilty of two counts of burglary and each count of failing footnotes record that the appellant had "knowingly and intelligently waived [his] right to responsibility to inquire into the defendant's understanding of the charges against finally, the court expressly told the appellant "that at any time you can change 180-day period under the rule. w.r.cr.p. 48(b)(3)(d). 180 days allowed in w.r.cr.p. 48. while the appellant advocates for that date, to be here. but i'm going to get this set as quickly as i can." van riper v. state, 882 p.2d 230, 234 (wyo. 1994). "it is the district court's punishments, and any additional facts essential to a defendant possesses the intelligence and the capacity own behalf even though he has court-appointed counsel." counsel requested appointment. counsel stated that he was concerned that counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of "however, when the delay is so protracted as to be issues were properly addressed and settled, an arraignment was held and the himself timely, knowingly, and intelligently requests the right to forgo counsel, [8] before the district court had an opportunity to hear the motion to vacate, 835, 95 s.ct. 2525, 2541, 45 l.ed.2d 562 (1975). his preliminary hearing. your mind to retain counsel to represent you or to petition the court for [23] w.r.cr.p. 48 specifically excludes from the speedy trial computation "[a]ll defender to withdraw. at the hearing, the state argued that the motion to proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the defendant." report, the district court found the appellant had "the capacity to comprehend his representing appellant: humphrey, 2008 wy 67, 22, 185 p.3d at 1244 (561 days); strandlien v. state, he also concedes that the october 28, 2009, hearing did not meet the shall be brought to trial within 180 days following arraignment unless continued question of whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial in violation of the filings on his own behalf even though he has court- within the 180-day time period required by w.r.cr.p. 48 and met the of the charges against the appellant, the range of sentences that could be understanding does not require reversal when "the proceedings, and it's very difficult to work with a client amendment right to a speedy trial. initially requested "stand-in" counsel, he moved to represent himself, he [34] after reviewing the record, we find that the district court adequately the time of trial are subject to the sixth amendment to the united states calculation of the length of delay in bringing the competency became an issue, it was incumbent on the district court to address [28] as to the third factor, the appellant obviously asserted his right to a to which particular public defender had been assigned to the appellant's case. detrimental to his case. the appellant stated that he was not under the influence p.3d at 1245; strandlien, 2007 wy 66, 14, 156 p.3d at 991. "we assess "dangers and disadvantages to self-representation." see supra 14. represent himself `with stand in counsel'."1 [3] a felony information charging the appellant with burglary, larceny, [5] on october 19, 2009, the district court conducted a hearing to address proceedings to evaluate defendant`s competency and arraigned him only after 2009, as his arraignment because that was the date originally set for that procedure and the federal constitution. "w.r.cr.p. 48 governs the time period appellant to trial. strandlien [v. state], 2007 wy 66, ideally, the trial judge should conduct a 1155, 1158 (wyo. 2006) ("a criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he precise length of delay that automatically constitutes a and possible defenses, and is fully informed of situation." the district court then sought to clarify whether the appellant wanted [32] "the sixth amendment of the united states constitution requires that a was not denied the assistance of counsel. the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and assist an attorney with his defense or represent himself. his current public argument by mr. young. sending copies of those motions to counsel. furthermore, counsel advised the and that the appellant's failure to accept or employ an attorney might be state. in the appellant's decision to represent himself. we cannot say that the appellant its appointment because the appellant "wrote on [the affidavit] that he would assignment of counsel when he is so entitled, that the other public defenders were permitted to withdraw the public defender's office furthermore, the district court properly explained to the appellant the charges appreciate the consequences of his decision, and that conclusion that [the defendant] actually understood his right to time delays caused by the appellant's changes of counsel and delays caused by he could change his mind about proceeding pro se and either retain a lawyer or to appreciate the consequences of his decision, and statute 7-11-304(d) requires an examination of the defendant" and the court preparation." defendant knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his right to representation of defender's response that such was precluded by statute. at that hearing, aware of the disadvantages and the dangers of self-representation." id. his right to counsel is a constitutional issue and, therefore, a question of law we himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in asked him how he would like to proceed, he stated, "i'm proposing that i have my a new attorney would likely require a continuance and that it could not make such gregory a. phillips, wyoming attorney general; terry l. armitage, deputy [12] the appellant's third attorney moved to vacate his appointment on waived your right to counsel. admonished as to specific "dangers and disadvantages to self-representation" [7] a week later, on november 4, 2009, the public defender's office filed trial. the appellant indicated that he understood and stated that he did not want appointed to represent the appellant reported that he repeatedly filed his own that the defendant has clearly been advised of his united states v. willie, 941 f.2d 1384, 1388 (10th considered "it detrimental for [the appellant] to not accept or employ counsel to technically there has been an order entered, then we need to allow that counsel 2010, after the evaluation was complete, the district court held a hearing on the counsel when he is so entitled, that the defendant charges and the proceedings, the range of diane m. lozano, state public defender; tina n. olson, appellate him, the allowable punishments, possible defenses, and the risks of proceeding [11] on april 29, 2010, the appellant, through his third appointed counsel, filed [him.]" the appellant responded that, after going through three attorneys, he v. counsel." 941 f.2d at 1389. "[a] defendant need not court that the appellant had "implied that he will continue to make filings on his understanding that we don't do it as stand-by counsel." the appellant confirmed against the appellant on october 2, 2009. that same day, the appellant himself, it wanted to be positive that he was capable of doing so and understood court for, among other things, a separation of the charges, full discovery, and constitutional requirements of the sixth amendment to the united states threshold requirement). motions without discussing them with counsel and would not follow instructions voigt, justice. suffered any delay-related prejudice that he did not cause. represent [him]." see supra 14. also, it expressly detailed the numerous that the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments appellee (plaintiff). smith v. state, 871 p.2d 186, 190 (wyo. 1994) (trial court suspended we're kind of working at cross purposes here. [the counsel; david e. westling, senior assistant appellate counsel. 2. whether the district court properly informed the appellant of the grounds that he had been "appointed as [the appellant]'s counsel . . . after two myself w[ith] stand in counsel." also, on october 2, 2009, the appellant waived of the appellant's lack of cooperation, and, finally, at the competency hearing the united states supreme court have made clear that the "competency requirement represent himself." pointing to the inconsistencies, the public defender that the defendant comprehends the nature of the by w.r.cr.p. 48. the state contends that the appellant caused most of the another handwritten pro se "motion requesting the courts to order listed expert the appellant filed various handwritten motions, including a motion for permission himself, defense counsel moved for a competency evaluation. on january 6, because the trial court did not make the meaningful inquiry necessary before [the entered. presumptively prejudicial, inquiry into the other factors order competently and intelligently to choose self- counsel he would like to use our office, the next he wouldn't." and knowingly and intelligently waived his right to . . . . so you have knowingly and intelligently a continuance but would proceed without counsel. and potential sentences he faced, and the appellant told the court he understood witnesses reqiuered [sic] for trial." two separate occasions" and one appointed attorney's "failing to appear to my dates for jury trial," "motion to be granted access to law library," "motion for to represent himself if the appellant's "conduct deliberately engages in serious counsel." trujillo v. state, 2 p.3d 567, 571 (wyo. 2000). 7, 156 p.3d [986,] 990 [(wyo. 2007)]. there is no the case of barker v. wingo, 407 u.s. 514, 530, 92 s.ct. 2182, 1292, 33 appeal from the district court of park county had adequately addressed the appellant's competency, it arraigned him on the be given access to a law library 1 to 2 hours a week 02. if a defendant elects to proceed without counsel, "the court must make him with efforts by the appellant to refuse, change or dismiss counsel. the appellant that he be relieved of his appointment "[b]ecause the [appellant] acts as his own arising from an incident when he stole and crashed a vehicle. in this appeal he speedy trial claims." humphrey v. state, 2008 wy 67, 20, 185 p.3d 1236, a public defender was entered. in the affidavit, the appellant wrote, "rep[resent] keep my trial. i want to go forward with whatever it is and get closure on this appellant's examiner had found him competent to proceed and able to either aid if he's going to be filing his own motions and acting as advocated for a competency determination because "[i]t appears that one minute surrounding facts and circumstances, including [the whether the district court properly informed the and the proceedings, the range of permissible that counsel's statement was correct. requested new counsel, his third attorney moved to vacate appointment because (internal citations omitted). w.r.cr.p. 48(b)(2) requires that: "a criminal charge position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, to conduct his 2005). the district court set a hearing on this motion to vacate for january 6, 2010. filed additional motions for change of venue, allegedly on "due process" grounds, that, his current public defender responded, "your honor, we have numerous determining he was fit to proceed). in the present case, once the district court the defendant on the record to demonstrate "definitely [] going to trial on these charges, with or without a public defense." [18] speedy trial questions are governed by both the rules of criminal this factor weighs heavily against the appellant's speedy trial violation claim. stewart m. young, faculty director, prosecution assistance program. requirements of w.r.cr.p. 10, as no charges were read and no plea was court placed the appellant under oath and asked if he was knowingly and facts for the delay is the determination of the defendant`s mental competency to stand a great deal of knowledge regarding criminal law this first factor is a threshold factor which requires a letters, correspondence from [the appellant], indicating that he chooses to broad understanding of the case. court found and concluded as follows: resulted in a 334-day delay between arraignment and trial far exceeding the without counsel. 2002). we consider "the record as a whole when determining whether the appointed attorneys' efforts effectively to represent him. we agree with the not to file such motions. w.r.cr.p. 48 specifically states that delays attributable 396, 113 s.ct. 2680, 2685, 125 l.ed.2d 321 (1993))). both this court and the volume. appointed attorneys, which actions caused significant delays. such conduct factors in determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred: the length of of proceeding without counsel. finding no error, we affirm. trial on the 28th, if that's okay with you, your honor." the district court explained issues appellant on the six charges against him. appellant] went to trial representing himself." this contention is simply review de novo. wilkie v. state, 2002 wy 164, 4, 56 p.3d 1023, 1024 (wyo. supreme court building, cheyenne, wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other the district court stated it was "not going to have this hearing without you having ordered the wyoming state hospital to conduct an examination. on april 14, represent himself shall not be entitled to "standby counsel" under the public defender act. appellant of the dangers of proceeding without representing himself. the appellant replied affirmatively to both inquiries, and the penalties he faced. [29] finally, the fourth factor focuses on the degree of prejudice that the [1] the appellant, jeramie john edwin large, was charged with six crimes [9] given the appellant's erratic behavior and apparent desire to represent and obstructionist misconduct before the court . . . ." finally, the court [27] regarding the second factor the reason for the delay as noted above, appellant's competency. at that hearing, the appellant's counsel noted that the delay between his arrest and arraignment as he continually undermined his just want to go to trial and get some closure on this." when the district court counsel, but before his arraignment, the public defender's office moved to vacate thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of [14] two weeks later at a pretrial hearing, the district court again addressed counsel, further delay occurred when it became necessary to determine the to a "defendant's change of counsel or application thereof" are excluded from the constitutional speedy trial violation. berry [v. state], advise him of the dangers of self-representation and, as a consequence, denied him his right to counsel. whether the appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived imposed upon conviction of those crimes, and that the sentences could run violated as he was properly informed and warned of the dangers of proceeding 1243 (wyo. 2008). the barker v. wingo test "requires consideration of four october term, a.d. 2011 interference with a police officer, failure to provide personal information after a constitutional rights and amended rights." on september 2, 2010, he filed degree of charges, etc." a few weeks later, on december 7, 2009, the appellant 509 u.s. at 403, 113 s.ct. at 2689). 21, 26 (wyo. 2001) (658 days). nevertheless, we will analyze the other three for an "evidentiary hearing . . . regarding inconsistencies and statues [sic], argues that he was prejudiced by the delay inasmuch as his incarceration "limited responded that he would like the district court to appoint a different attorney. to attorney general; d. michael pauling, senior assistant attorney general; court. . . . [the appellant] evidently feels that he has proceedings necessary to determine the appellant's competency. once these to decline representation by the public defender's office and proceed set arraignment . . . and failure to properly represent me on my matters." complete inquiry on the record into the defendant's 1 further postponements of the trial, even if the appellant brought a new attorney another motion to vacate its appointment, stating: w.r.cr.p. 48(b)(3)(a). indeed, we have said that "[w]here the primary reason representation." faretta v. california, 422 u.s. 806, acknowledged that he understood the court's explanations and warnings. se "motion to address the courts of violating my right to a speedy trial, by [sic] hauck v. state, 2001 wy 119, 14, 36 p.3d 597, 601 (wyo. 2001); see also present case, although the 363-day delay between the appellant's arrest and trial is required." id. defense in a rational manner, and the ability to cooperate with counsel to the end to attend his grandmother's funeral, "motion to represent myself," "motion to set [the appellant] has implied he will continue to make to assistance, including his right to the assignment of appellant's competency prior to arraigning him. when the appellant's intelligently waiving his right to counsel. the court informed him that, at any time, defense." strandlien, 2007 wy 66, 14, 156 p.3d at 991; see also barker, 407 into the case. the court also warned that it would no longer allow the appellant as provided in this rule." in deciding this issue, we must first determine the 2011 wy 159 [30] after analyzing the present facts under the four-factor barker v. wingo proper date of arraignment. for jury trial at this time." the district court then explained to the appellant that "if discussion [20] the state agrees that the october 28, 2009, hearing lacked the hallmarks six charges and conducted his jury trial within 180 days of that arraignment. an application for appointment of the public defender's office . . . with the full contradicted the appellant's stated desire for a speedy disposition of his case. [21] the appellant significantly delayed both his arraignment and trial by his legal research, hindered his ability to serve subpoenas and eliminated his appellant suffered as a result of the delay. humphrey, 2008 wy 67, 28, 185 recommendations by his court-appointed attorney. [17] in the first of two issues raised by the appellant, he asserts that he was


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