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U.S. v Campbell

Case No. 12-13647 (C.A. 11, Feb. 20, 2014)

Two changes in law—a statutory change and a decisional change—require us to reconsider whether the admission of a certification of the Secretary of State to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction for a prosecution of drug trafficking on the high seas violates a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him at trial. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In United States v. Rojas, we held that the admission at trial of a certification to establish jurisdiction over a Panamanian vessel laden with cocaine and seized on the high seas did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 53 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 1995). After we decided Rojas, Congress amended the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act to provide that “jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge,” and that the “[j]urisdiction of the United States with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is not an element of an offense.” Pub. L. 104-324, § 1138, 110 Stat. 3901, 3988-89, (1996) (codified as amended 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a)). Also after we decided Rojas, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980), and held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a testimonial statement by “a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365 (2004). In the light of these changes in law, we reach the same decision we reached in Rojas, but for a different reason. Because the certification proves jurisdiction, as a diplomatic courtesy to a foreign nation, and does not prove an element of a defendant’s culpability, we conclude that the pretrial admission of the certification does not violate the Confrontation Clause.

I. BACKGROUND



On October 26, 2011, the United States Coast Guard observed a vessel in the international waters off the eastern coast of Jamaica. While the Coast Guard was pursuing the vessel, the three individuals aboard the vessel discarded dozens of bales into the water, which the Coast Guard later determined to be approximately 997 kilograms of marijuana. The vessel lacked all indicia of nationality: it displayed no flag, port, or registration number. Glenroy Parchment identified himself as the master of the vessel and claimed the vessel was registered in Haiti. The Coast Guard then contacted the Republic of Haiti to inquire whether the vessel was of Haitian nationality. The government of Haiti responded that it could neither confirm nor deny the registry. The other two individuals aboard the vessel, Christopher Patrick Campbell and Pierre Nadin Alegrand, as well as Parchment later admitted that they knew they were illegally transporting marijuana.

After a federal grand jury indicted Campbell, Alegrand, and Parchment under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq., for conspiracy to possess and for possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, id. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(G), Campbell filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on three grounds: (1) that admission of a certification of the Secretary of State to prove a response to a claim of registry, see 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2), would violate Campbell’s right under the Confrontation Clause and that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Campbell was aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; (2) that the Act violated Campbell’s right to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment because he had no contacts with the United States; and (3) that Congress exceeded its constitutional power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas when it enacted the Act. Campbell conceded that our precedents foreclosed his last two arguments, but he stated his intent to preserve his objections for further review.
 

 

Judge(s): Jill Pryor
Jurisdiction: U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Related Categories: Constitutional Law , Criminal Justice
 
Circuit Court Judge(s)
Peter Fay
Adalberto Jordan
Jill Pryor

 

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washington, 541 u.s. 36, 53–54, 124 s. ct. 1354, 1365 (2004). in the light of case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 22 of 23 our precedents. “[w]e have always upheld extraterritorial convictions under our “loose signification.” the federalist no. 42, at 262 (james madison) (clinton campbell argues that the fifth and sixth amendments require a jury to displayed no flag, port, or registration number. glenroy parchment identified campbell’s right under the confrontation clause. in united states v. tinoco, we (holding that the sixth amendment does not provide a confrontation right at a really a separate question and does not go to the admissibility of the certification.” “any seaman or other person [who] commit[s] manslaughter upon the high seas,” felonies at the founding, but we disagree. although we have recognized that “there that a certification of the secretary of state is conclusive proof of a response to a and cross-examination] are essential in criminal trials where the accused, if found responded that it could neither confirm nor deny the registry of the vessel. conspiracy to possess and for possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or statements of commander deptula, who explained that he had asked the haitian jurisdiction does not implicate the confrontation clause, we need not decide guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with an offense under the act. precedents foreclosed his last two arguments, but he stated his intent to preserve tinoco, 304 f.3d at 1108 (quoting united states v. gonzalez, 776 f.2d 931, 939 law dictionary (10th ed. 1782) (listing types of punishment for felonies at be determined solely by the trial judge,” and that the “[j]urisdiction of the united california v. green, 399 u.s. 149, 157, 90 s. ct. 1930, 1934–35 (1970) (“our own doubt that a certification of the secretary of state is testimonial hearsay because confront witnesses to other pre- and post-trial proceedings that do not concern the clause does not apply.” united states v. nueci–peña, 711 f.3d 191, 199 (1st cir. neither confirm nor deny the registration of the vessel and not that the campbell stipulated to the admission of the representations by the coast fails for two reasons. first, campbell waived his right to a jury trial in a signed, c. the district court did not err when it determined it had jurisdiction based proof of an actual or intended effect inside the unites states.” gonzalez, 776 f.2d 2 (1820) (acknowledging the “indeterminate” definition of felony under the felonies bellaizac–hurtado, 700 f.3d at 1257. and we have long upheld the authority of right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on id. § 12, 1 stat. at 115; and imposed a seven-year maximum sentence for intending provide that extraterritorial jurisdiction is “not an element of an offense,” but is preliminary hearing); lachappelle v. moran, 699 f.2d 560, 564–65 (1st cir. 1983) case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 19 of 23 e. campbell’s conviction did not violate his right to due process. which have been by any such pirate or robber piratically and feloniously taken” “an objective state department designee would not expect that the certifications amended the act to provide that “[j]urisdiction of the united states with respect to statutory provisions that go to whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. . . . violate the confrontation clause. on the high seas.” estupinan, 453 f.3d at 1339 (internal quotation marks omitted). the coast guard then contacted the republic of haiti to inquire whether the vessel under the fifth amendment because he had no contacts with the united states; and amended 46 u.s.c. § 70504(a)). also after we decided rojas, the supreme court should determine the primary purpose of the interrogation by objectively 6 not apply at sentencing and noting that all other federal circuit courts that hear manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance on board . . . a vessel subject to plaintiff-appellee, 273 u.s. 593, 606, 47 s. ct. 531, 535 (1927). the supreme court explained that confront the witnesses against him. 7 under the maritime drug law enforcement act, 46 u.s.c. § 70501 et seq., for establishing or proving some fact,” such as an affidavit, custodial examination, or written filing. second, as explained in the preceding section, we have rejected the evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in light of the 11 (11th cir. 2011); estupinan, 453 f.3d at 1338 (“[t]his circuit and other circuits case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 10 of 23 christopher patrick campbell and pierre nadin alegrand, as well as parchment on the certification of the secretary of state. imprisonment and hard labor). as james madison explained, in defense of the 1210 (d.c. cir. 1996) (holding that the confrontation right does not apply at a u.s. const. amend. vi. in united states v. rojas, we held that the admission at 4 i. background had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 541 u.s. at 53–54, 124 s. ct. haiti that actually signed a certificate or provided any documents.” the district in united states v. estupinan, we rejected an argument “that congress exceeded its 23 contain three distinct grants of power: to define and punish piracies, to define and not bar the admission of hearsay to make a pretrial determination of jurisdiction question of the defendants’ guilt or innocence. it only affected the right of the court in the united states court of appeals to “maim or disfigure” a person “upon the high seas, id. § 13. that a district court could decide before trial the jurisdictional issue about the the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that the certification of defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” crawford v. instead a “preliminary question[] of law to be determined solely by the trial judge.” 1248 (11th cir. 2012). this appeal involves a conviction for an offense defined by furthered by the confrontation clause.” (emphasis added)); barber v. page, 390 campbell argues that congress cannot proscribe drug trafficking on the high the united states; (2) that the act violated campbell’s right to due process of law occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands or goods.”); giles jacob, a new (february 20, 2014) iv. conclusion the jurisdiction of the united states.” 46 u.s.c. § 70503(a)(1). in 1996, congress held that the confrontation clause bars the admission of a testimonial statement by was of haitian nationality. the government of haiti responded that it could neither campbell cites united states v. palmer, 16 u.s. (3 wheat.) 610, (1818), to to hold their persons for trial.” id. communication from a haitian official actually occurred. campbell acknowledged for obtaining a response from a foreign nation to a claim of registry and provides committed on the high seas when it enacted the act. campbell conceded that our whether the confrontation clause bars the admission of a statement at trial, it hearings in prisons].”); cf. united states v. clark, 475 f.2d 240, 247 (2d cir. 1973) served solely to identify which other crimes were included in the statute even campbell challenges his convictions on five grounds, four of which attack united states of america, the due process clause of the fifth amendment does not prohibit the trial and that traditionally would have been treated as elements of an offense under the two changes in law—a statutory change and a decisional change—require the issue of jurisdiction “was necessarily preliminary to th[e] trial” because “[t]he u.s. 719, 725, 88 s. ct. 1318, 1322 (1968) (“the right to confrontation is basically 2009) (questioning whether a certification of the secretary of state under the act is overruled its decision in ohio v. roberts, 448 u.s. 56, 100 s. ct. 2531 (1980), and appeal from the united states district court united states v. rendon, 354 f.3d 1320, 1327 (11th cir. 2003) (reiterating that [a felony was] an offense for which conviction result[ed] in forfeiture of the we affirm campbell’s judgment of convictions. adjudication of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. see, e.g., united states v. powell, 11 state without the ability to cross-examine a haitian witness violated his right under ii. standards of review cocaine and seized on the high seas did not violate the confrontation clause of the 51. and both this court and other courts have declined to extend the right to mexico, --- u.s. ---, 131 s. ct. 2705, 2713 (2011) (“as a rule, if an out-of-court (11th cir. 1985)). and “[t]he protective principle does not require that there be against the law of nations. united states v. bellaizac–hurtado, 700 f.3d 1245, the confrontation clause, but that argument fails. the confrontation clause does extraterritorial jurisdiction is not an element of the offense). and, unlike some f.3d at 1325 (“because stateless vessels do not fall within the veil of another statement “is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of court upheld a law enacted by congress under the piracies and felonies clause stipulation about the communication between commander deptula and haiti nathan dane, digest of american law 715 (1823)); see 2 timothy cunningham, his objections for further review. governments.” id. at 1109. the confrontation clause protects a defendant’s trial chapter are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial iii. discussion consideration by the jury because that requirement “does not raise factual questions case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 3 of 23 pretrial detention hearing because the purpose is to determine whether accused term to include a broader range of crimes. the united states under the act. crawford standard that permitted the admission of hearsay if it was sufficiently determination of jurisdiction where the certification does not implicate either the defendant’s lands or goods (or both) to the crown, regardless of whether any campbell objected to the admission of the certification on the ground that it determine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction exists, but campbell’s argument not punishable by death. although palmer did not address this issue, we have f.3d at 1108. instead, the jurisdictional requirement serves as a “diplomatic (“felony is diſtinguifhed from lighter offences, in that the puniſment of it is death: 20 guilty, may be subjected to the most serious deprivations. . . . but they are not crime, especially those punishable by death.” eugene kontorovich, the “define though not particularly recited. id. at 628. palmer did not address whether fifth and sixth amendments to have a jury determine that issue. third, campbell 15 capital or other punishment [was] mandated.” black’s law dictionary 651 (8th ed. u.s. const. art. i, § 8, cl. 10. the supreme court has interpreted that clause to at 1365 (emphasis added). the supreme court explained that a testimonial precedents foreclose his argument. after all, the supreme court long ago held, in a felonies clause, but palmer did not address this issue. in palmer, the supreme d.c. docket no. 4:11-cr-10021-jem-2 and the travel act, id. § 1952(a), “require[] a particularized, case-by-case factual christopher patrick campbell, rossiter ed., 1961); see also united states v. smith, 18 u.s. (5 wheat.) 153, 159 concedes that our precedents foreclose this argument too. we held in rendon that secretary of state to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. seizure of evidence which the government plans to use later in seeking to prove rights universally applicable to all hearings[,] . . . and it does not appear that and subject them to their laws.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant bales into the water, which the coast guard later determined to be approximately the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination.”); law enforcement act].” 453 f.3d 1336, 1338 (11th cir. 2006). campbell’s right under the confrontation clause and that there was insufficient case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 16 of 23 case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 13 of 23 quotation marks omitted). but the supreme court has never extended the reach of for the eleventh circuit proved only the representation by the coast guard that a haitian official could of the united states and defines a stateless vessel as including “a vessel aboard at 1210. and “inasmuch as the trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 12 of 23 the constitutionality of the act. first, campbell argues that the admission of the at 939. congress also may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction because “the law proceeding “is not a stage of the trial at which an accused must be present”); the admission of the certification of the secretary of state did not violate aboard stateless vessels on the high seas. 354 f.3d at 1326. and “this [c]ircuit and ________________________ support its extraterritorial reach. see united states v. saac, 632 f.3d 1203, 1209– united states v. marino–garcia, 679 f.2d 1373, 1383 (11th cir. 1982). moreover, drug trafficking laws as an exercise of power under the felonies clause.” see finding that some product or activity of the defendant relate in some way to certification of the secretary of state, but he argued “that there was nobody from punish felonies committed on the high seas, and to define and punish offenses d. the act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the felonies therefore provided conclusive proof that the vessel was within the jurisdiction of authority under the piracies and felonies clause in enacting the [maritime drug authority to proscribe the offense under article i, the act makes the determination location of the vessel without submitting that issue to a jury. ford v. united states, law-abiding nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is ‘fundamentally unfair’ 21 650 f.3d 388, 392–93 (4th cir. 2011) (holding that the confrontation clause does issue whether the ship was seized within the prescribed limit did not affect the clause). campbell’s argument that only capital crimes were felonies at the time of burglary, robbery, rape, chance-medley, and petit larceny and that punishments for is a dearth of authority interpreting the scope of congress’s power under the that many federal criminal statutes, such as the hobbs act, 18 u.s.c. § 1951(a), confrontation right does not apply at a preliminary hearing); see also wolff v. guard in the certification, and the act provides that the certification is conclusive 541 u.s. at 61–62, 124 s. ct. at 1370–71. and congress amended the act to grounds: (1) that admission of a certification of the secretary of state to prove a the confrontation clause beyond the confines of a trial. see bullcoming v. new case about a ship seized at sea for carrying contraband (liquor during prohibition), introduction of a certification of the secretary of state under the act, 53 f.3d at common law,” such as the actus reus, causation, and the mens rea elements. 304 congress could exercise its power, under the felonies clause, to proscribe conduct defendant’s criminal conduct and the united states.” (internal quotation marks and what sense we are to understand this word.” tress, supra, at 463, 465 (quoting 6 statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at ‘confront’ the witnesses at the time of trial that forms the core of the values versus responded that it could neither confirm nor deny the registry. the certification federal crimes in which the jurisdictional element provides congress with the a pretrial determination and conclude only that it does not apply to this pretrial no. 12-13647 defendant-appellant. international waters off the eastern coast of jamaica. while the coast guard was within the body of a county, would by the laws of the united states, be punishable f.3d at 1327; tinoco, 304 f.3d at 1109–10. campbell acknowledges that these 2004); see also 4 william blackstone, commentaries *94 (1769) (“felony, in the 13 mcdonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 567–68, 94 s. ct. 2963, 2980 (1974) (“[confrontation culpability, we conclude that the pretrial admission of the certification does not argument that a jury must determine jurisdiction under the act. see rendon, 354 similar oral or electronic means, and is proved conclusively by certification of the campbell argues that congress exceeded its authority under the felonies certification. the district court did not err. before pryor, jordan, and fay, circuit judges. when that hearsay does not pertain to an element of the offense. because the case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 21 of 23 high seas that did not warrant capital punishment. in the crimes act of 1790, the is based on the defendant’s participation in drug trafficking activities, not on the nexus to the united states and because drug trafficking was not a capital offense places no restrictions upon a nation’s right to subject stateless vessels to its a vessel subject to this chapter is not an element of an offense.” 46 u.s.c. § of state lacked details about the communications between the coast guard and recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems.’” supreme court has never extended the reach of the confrontation clause beyond response to a claim of registry, see 46 u.s.c. § 70502(d)(2), would violate clause when it enacted the act because his drug trafficking offense lacked any are engaged in conduct that ‘has a potentially adverse effect and is generally on october 26, 2011, the united states coast guard observed a vessel in the f.3d at 1338 (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted). campbell’s case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 2 of 23 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). stateless vessels, such as the one campbell argues that the admission of the certification of the secretary of case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 14 of 23 power of congress to define felonies on the high seas, the term “felony” has a added). the act does not require the certification of the secretary of state to proof of a response to a claim of registry. the certification contained the a new and complete law dictionary (3d ed. 1783) (explaining that, “by the law at guilt”). we need not decide whether the confrontation clause could ever apply to campbell argues that the district court erred when it determined that 5 b. the pretrial determination of jurisdiction does not violate the fifth or sixth of registry under paragraph (1)(a) or (c) may be made by radio, telephone, or states with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is not an element of an campbell waived his right to a trial by jury in a written statement signed by 22 circumstances in which the interrogation occurs.” (emphasis added) (internal because “the suppression hearing centers upon the validity of the search for and repeatedly held that congress has the power, under the felonies clause, to the constitution empowers congress “[t]o define and punish piracies and confrontation and cross-examination are generally required in [disciplinary of jurisdiction a discretionary “statutory hurdle[] to a court’s subject matter lands). “by the late seventeenth century, felony had come to mean any very serious that the act was constitutional both on its face and as applied to campbell. the for the southern district of florida 149, 160 (2009) (quoting blackstone, supra, at *94); see also jacob, supra on the merits”); united states v. andrus, 775 f.2d 825, 836 (7th cir. 1985) the confrontation clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the include the details of how an official received or from whom the official received violated his right under the confrontation clause. second, campbell contends that power under the felonies clause to include proscribing criminal conduct on the judge.” id. jurisdiction “does not affect the defendant’s blameworthiness or culpability, which early american republic, 57 clev. st. l. rev. 461, 465 (2009). “at common law, and punished that conduct with “imprison[ment] not exceeding three years,” ch. 9, robber, or receive or take into his custody any ship, vessel, goods or chattels, stateless nature of campbell’s vessel was not an element of his offense to be which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which first congress made it a crime at sea to “entertain or conceal any such pirate or him, his counsel, the prosecutor, and the district court judge, and at a bench trial, ________________________ later admitted that they knew they were illegally transporting marijuana. republic of haiti to inquire whether the vessel was registered there and that haiti (holding that the confrontation right does not apply at an in camera conference to we review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. for a criminal offense. fifth, campbell argues that his conviction violated his right to between a defendant’s criminal conduct and the united states.” estupinan, 453 the secretary of state established extraterritorial jurisdiction over the vessel and the act declares “a vessel without nationality” as subject to the jurisdiction congress to “extend[] the criminal jurisdiction of this country to any stateless 1216, but we decided that issue before congress made the determination of case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 18 of 23 right to confront testimony offered against him to establish his guilt, and the case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 9 of 23 hearing about whether the certification of the secretary of state established (discussing that for stateless vessels, no proof of nexus is required); rendon, 354 9 the pretrial determination of jurisdiction under the act violated his rights under the the supreme court decided crawford. our decision in rojas relied on the pre- at the time of the founding, there was “ambiguity in the meaning of [a] rendon, 354 f.3d at 1326. during the founding era, but he acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by criminal appeals agree); united states v. cantellano, 430 f.3d 1142, 1146 (11th daniel deptula of the united states coast guard that he had contacted the and punish” clause and the limits of universal jurisdiction, 103 nw. u. l. rev. offense.” pub. l. 104-324, § 1138, 110 stat. 3901, 3988-89, (1996) (codified as in rojas, we rejected a challenge, under the confrontation clause, to the “whether there should be further proof beyond the state department document is sovereign’s territorial protection, all nations can treat them as their own territory reliable. id.; roberts, 448 u.s. at 66, 100 s. ct. at 2539, abrogated by crawford, support his argument that congress may punish only capital offenses under the establish extraterritorial jurisdiction for a prosecution of drug trafficking on the 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also mitchell–hunter, 663 f.3d at courtesy to foreign nations and as a matter of international comity.” id. proof of a trial right.” (emphasis added)). pryor, circuit judge: “jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to amendment. had an opportunity to confront that witness.” (emphasis added)); michigan v. secretary of state or the secretary’s designee.” id. § 70502(d)(2) (emphasis accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him 19 interstate commerce”). this jurisdictional requirement “is unique because it is not the vessel is of its nationality.” id. § 70502(c)(1)(a), (d)(1)(c). congress made high seas violates a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him at trial. meant to have any bearing on the individual defendant, but instead is meant to bear smoothness of international relations between countries.” id. at 1109; see also for the district court to determine that it had jurisdiction. fourth, campbell argues testimonial within the meaning of the confrontation clause). determine the reason a witness refuses to answer a question because such a judicial because his offense of drug trafficking lacked a nexus to the united states, but he argues that the certification of the secretary of state provided insufficient evidence 70504(a). the section continues that “[j]urisdictional issues arising under this 1382; see also united states v. perlaza, 439 f.3d 1149, 1161 (9th cir. 2006) quotation marks omitted)); pennsylvania v. ritchie, 480 u.s. 39, 52, 107 s. ct. more of marijuana, id. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 u.s.c. 12 jurisdiction.” united states v. ibarguen–mosquera, 634 f.3d 1370, 1379 (11th cir. jurisdiction. at the hearing, the united states introduced into evidence the person from “knowingly or intentionally . . . possess[ing] with intent to (holding that the confrontation right applies at a pretrial suppression hearing 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “we review de novo the legal question of with death.” id. at 626–27. but the court explained that “punishable with death” 14 the founding fails because the founding generation would have understood the the confines of a trial. and, because a pretrial determination of extraterritorial due process under the fifth amendment because he had no contacts with the held that congress was entitled to remove the jurisdictional requirement from felony.” will tress, unintended collateral consequences: defining felony in the . . . .” u.s. const. amend. vi. in crawford, the supreme court ruled that the whether the certification of the secretary of state is testimonial in nature. cf. courtesy to a foreign nation, and does not prove an element of a defendant’s ________________________ [publish] would be used at trial, as they are relegated by statute to the pretrial jurisdiction extraterritorial jurisdiction a pretrial issue of law for the district court and before vessel in international waters engaged in the distribution of controlled substances.” 16 example, we review “de novo a district court’s interpretation and application of reviewed for clear error.” united states v. tinoco, 304 f.3d 1088, 1114 (11th cir. multi-definitional term” with “so many meanings from so many parts of the 8 haiti and that the united states did not offer any testimony to corroborate the the district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who held a these changes in law, we reach the same decision we reached in rojas, but for a although these changes in law mean that rojas no longer controls this issue, case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 17 of 23 the district court’s factual findings with respect to jurisdiction, however, are pursuing the vessel, the three individuals aboard the vessel discarded dozens of clause. have not embellished the [act] with the requirement of a nexus between a congress amended the maritime drug law enforcement act to provide that our analysis aligns with other authorities too. for example, faced with the context, where evidence does not go to guilt or innocence, the confrontation felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations.” campbell boarded, are “international pariahs” that have “no internationally an act of congress under the second grant of power. congress “may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over vessels in the high seas that felonies ranged from death and forfeiture of goods and chattels to terms of case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 5 of 23 though it be loſs of goods . . . .”). and at the time of the founding, felony was “a cir. 2005) (holding that, even after crawford, the confrontation right does not other circuits have not embellished the [act] with the requirement of a nexus but not always, for petit larceny is felony, . . . yet it is not puniſhed by death, ________________________ 17 § 11, 1 stat. 112, 114; imposed a three-year maximum sentence, if convicted, for united states v. mitchell–hunter, 663 f.3d 45, 52 (1st cir. 2011) (expressing that congress lacked the power under the felonies clause to define his conduct as 18 a. the confrontation clause does not bar the admission of a certification of the this day,” felonies included treason, murder, homicide, burning of houses, objections de novo. united states v. brown, 364 f.3d 1266, 1268 (11th cir. 2004). whether a statute is constitutional.” id. at 1099. and we review constitutional that the district court had already determined its jurisdiction based only on the extraterritorial jurisdiction existed. he argues that the certification of the secretary prior testimony at a preliminary hearing. id. at 51, 124 s. ct. at 1364 (internal common law, including death, loss of inheritance, and forfeiture of goods and the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 1 of 23 case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 4 of 23 court found campbell guilty on both the conspiracy and possession counts. case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 15 of 23 united states v. harris, 458 f.2d 670, 677–78 (5th cir. 1972), (holding that the the response to a claim of registry from a foreign nation. case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 7 of 23 sixth amendment. 53 f.3d 1212, 1216 (11th cir. 1995). after we decided rojas, us to reconsider whether the admission of a certification of the secretary of state to bryant, --- u.s. ---, 131 s. ct. 1143, 1162 (2011) (“[w]hen a court must determine overruled the objection because the certification was “self-authenticating” and case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 23 of 23 trial of a certification to establish jurisdiction over a panamanian vessel laden with may remain at large, and it “is neither a discovery device for the defense nor a trial case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 11 of 23 himself as the master of the vessel and claimed the vessel was registered in haiti. united states. these arguments fail. 10 conviction of an alien captured on the high seas while drug trafficking, because the the parties stipulated to the material facts. but campbell maintained at trial that the evidence to prove that campbell was aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of determination”); united states v. angulo–hernández, 565 f.3d 2, 12 (1st cir. confirm nor deny the registry. the other two individuals aboard the vessel, common law[] and so many statutes . . . that it is impossible to know precisely in decisions seem to have recognized at an early date that it is this literal right to have a nexus to the united states because universal and protective principles violated his right under the confrontation clause, but the magistrate judge 989, 999 (1987) (opinion of powell, j.) (“the opinions of this court show that the act provides clear notice that all nations prohibit and condemn drug trafficking for congress to provide for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics “a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the proscribe drug trafficking on the high seas. see, e.g., estupinan, 453 f.3d at 1339; 46 u.s.c. § 70504(a). seas under the felonies clause because only capital crimes were considered that prohibited “murder or robbery, or any other offence, which, if committed apply at a non-capital sentencing hearing); united states v. smith, 79 f.3d 1208, clear that the act “applies even though the act is committed outside the territorial [felonies] clause,” saac, 632 f.3d at 1209, the first congress understood its recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas.” marino–garcia, 679 f.2d at campbell argues that his convictions violated his right to due process confrontation clause bars the admission of a testimonial statement by “a witness jurisdiction.” tinoco, 304 f.3d at 1104 n.18; see also id. at 1110 n.21 (explaining claim of registry by a foreign nation: “the response of a foreign nation to a claim case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 20 of 23 case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 6 of 23 3 government whether the suspect vessel was registered in haiti and that haiti (3) that congress exceeded its constitutional power to define and punish felonies congress enacted the maritime drug law enforcement act to prohibit any we also have recognized that the conduct proscribed by the act need not different reason. because the certification proves jurisdiction, as a diplomatic certification of the secretary of state, which included the statement of commander after a federal grand jury indicted campbell, alegrand, and parchment jurisdiction of the united states.” id. § 70503(b). the act permits several methods alterations omitted) (quoting rendon, 354 f.3d at 1325)). the felonies clause argument calendar trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has case: 12-13647 date filed: 02/20/2014 page: 8 of 23 proved at trial, the admission of the certification did not violate his right to 997 kilograms of marijuana. the vessel lacked all indicia of nationality: it certification of the secretary of state to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction district court adopted the report and recommendation. conviction did not violate his right to due process under the fifth amendment. general acceptation of our english law, comprize[d] every species of crime, which same issue raised by campbell, the first circuit held that, “in this non-trial only on the diplomatic relations between the united states and foreign empowers congress to punish crimes committed on the high seas. saac, 632 f.3d § 960(b)(2)(g), campbell filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on three


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