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U.S. v Rounds

Case No. 12-51081 (C.A. 5, Apr. 9, 2014)

Trevin Rounds was found guilty by a jury of being in possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (Count One) and using a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a juvenile to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count Two). He raises several issues on appeal, and we affirm.

I.



Before trial, Rounds moved to suppress “any and all photographic and/or video evidence that was gathered by the seizure and subsequent search of his phone.” The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Rounds and sheriff’s deputies Jeffery Whitson and Georgina Maritz testified. The court made the following findings: (1) Because Whitson “could not have viewed the contents of the phone without assistance from Defendant,” Rounds consented to the search; and (2) “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances . . . [,] consent was freely and voluntarily given.” Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress.

Shortly before trial, the government indicated that it planned to call Sheretta Trahan, Jane Doe’s godmother; because she had not been previously listed as a witness, defense counsel objected. The court (1) continued the trial for one hour to allow counsel an opportunity to meet with Rounds and Trahan and (2) delayed her testimony for one day. An hour later, counsel informed the court that he had been able to meet the witness and to confer with his client, and the witness had answered his questions. Although the court had delayed the witness from testifying for another day, because counsel told the court “I’m ready to go forward,” Trahan testified the same day.
 

 

Judge(s): Jerry E. Smith
Jurisdiction: U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Related Categories: Civil Procedure , Communications , Criminal Justice , Expert Witness , Government / Politics , International , Transportation
 
Circuit Court Judge(s)
Harold DeMoss
Stephen Higginson
Jerry Smith

 

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2014 u.s. app. lexis 5575, at *2 (5th cir. mar. 26, 2014) (en banc) (citing for trial because the government had a “material witness,” trahan, testify on voluntariness. case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 8 date filed: 04/09/2014 gence; and (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will favorable to the government as the prevailing party. id. testimony puts venue at issue, and the defendant objects or requests an instruction.”). no. 12-51081 no. 12-51081 an offense in a district where the offense was committed.” fed. r. crim. p. 18. phone number. next, between 3:41 a.m. and 4:20 a.m., rounds’s iphone had for one hour to allow counsel an opportunity to meet with rounds and trahan 14 10 a continuing offense is “a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a for the fifth circuit availability of discovery from the prosecution; (e) the complexity of the case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 2 date filed: 04/09/2014 tion’; to ‘induce’ is ‘to move and lead (as by persuasion or influence)’; and to ‘entice’ is ‘to draw somehow suppressed evidence, rounds has not demonstrated that the notes dant’s cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant’s awareness of his united states v. jones, 234 f.3d 234, 242 (5th cir. 2000). no single factor is evidence can establish that a defendant intended to induce, persuade, sages and phone calls. rounds eventually picked up jane in odessa on rounds’s iphone on march 17. those maps showed that the iphone was trav- rounds’s cellphone; (2) the time at which rounds consented to the search of 757, 1154, 1687 (unabridged ed. 1993))). sexually-explicit message: “would you let a man lick your anal area?” as the v. 760 (5th cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 s. ct. 1834 (2013). “the evidence need event, our inquiry focuses on the defendant’s intent, not the minor’s.8 no. 12-51081 rounds’s presence in odessa sufficiently established venue. the time needed; (c) the likelihood of prejudice from denial; (d) the error, the admission of the evidence in question must have substantially pre- intends to challenge the admission of exhibit 14, and further assuming he even the notes made during round’s initial arrest. fifth, rounds claims the court before smith, demoss, and higginson, circuit judges. rounds’s iphone had five consecutive incoming phone calls from the phone district: (1) phone calls and text messages sent on or about march 17 from court that he had been able to meet the witness and to confer with his client, strating that the court abused its discretion in allowing this evidence in spite criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public continuance, he invited any possible error by conceding he was ready to go for- sufficiently established venue.12 we therefore do not need to address whether western district; and houston (mostly harris county) is in the southern district. 2011). understood to be making one of two arguments. one, he could be maintaining 9 dispositive. see id. the prosecutor’s “burden cannot be discharged by showing as to his second contention, rounds argues that the consent cannot sheriff’s deputies jeffery whitson and georgina maritz testified. the court phone forensics. hardwick analyzed the two phones seized during the addressing rounds’s second theory, we consider the decision whether to ston to amarillo. rounds drove jane to the bus station, and shortly after she rounds and jane had an illegal sexual relationship that continued for a sub- 15 rounds may instead be attempting to reason that the search of photographs and a. case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 14 date filed: 04/09/2014 the district court did in fact grant a one-day continuance to both of the delayed disclosure. case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 6 date filed: 04/09/2014 ciently establish venue. see united states v. loe, 248 f.3d 449, 465 (5th cir. a. 2 see brady v. maryland, 373 u.s. 83 (1963). of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” united states v. vargas-ocampo, case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 15 date filed: 04/09/2014 no. 12-51081 although rounds disagrees with the court’s credibility determination, he pro- 11 6 during that time, jane and rounds continued to communicate via text mes- be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.” cavazos v. smith, 132 s. ct. 2, 4 the government presented lisa upton as an expert in telephone cell site no. 12-51081 contact occur, but that the defendant sought to persuade the minor to engage in that government did not timely disclose exhibit 14—the tagged messages between unless an exception applies, an officer, before conducting a search, must ent crime. rounds, however, does not point to any case that supports reversal case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 10 date filed: 04/09/2014 on the broader context of the communications. ing that the defendant need not communicate directly with the minor victim); barlow, 568 versus count two. tends that “[g]iven the continuing nature of the offense of coercion and entice- the jury to be instructed on venue, rounds has preserved both of these issues later that evening, rounds’s vehicle was pulled over in eden, texas, for case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 5 date filed: 04/09/2014 no. 12-51081 cretion, the decision to allow trahan to testify is not reversible error. the gov- filed cir. 2005). the plain-error standard requires first that there be error, a ready to go forward,” trahan testified the same day. listed as a witness, defense counsel objected. the court (1) continued the trial ence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defen- jackson v. virginia, 443 u.s. 307, 312 (1979) (emphasis in jackson). “[i]t is no. 12-51081 3 see united states v. frye, 489 f.3d 201, 207 (5th cir. 2007); united states v. santos, vii. me come or not.” a few hours later, when jane agreed to let rounds come get her, he states, 9 “unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute fifth circuit united states of america, grant a continuance to be within the sound discretion of the trial court. see (1) the voluntariness of the defendant’s custodial status; (2) the pres- (2011). in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court considers both “bye stp textin me.” after a brief period, rounds initiated the conversation again, asking, sel again objected to that late disclosure. in response, the court granted a one- rounds brings five challenges on appeal. first, he questions the suffi- mately twelve nights with rounds in a houston hotel room and had sex there. 2001). lyle w. cayce 16 b. “evidence showing the commission of any single act that was part of the begin- 391 u.s. 543, 548–49 (1968)). consent may not be “the product of duress or was freely and voluntarily given.” accordingly, the court denied the motion to in light of that relationship, the sexually-explicit tagged.com message, states v. lewis, 676 f.2d 508, 511 (11th cir. 1982); united states v. strickland, 493 f.2d 182, 4 rounds does not contest that he (1) had an illegal sexual relationship with jane doe; the government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,that the eling within texas, having left the houston area around 5:00 a.m. on march 17, because rounds did not raise a brady argument in the district court, we 7 clenney, 434 f.3d 780, 781 (5th cir. 2005). 10 (“to ‘persuade’ is ‘to induce by argument, entreaty, or expostulation into some mental posi- of exhibit 14. insofar as rounds now believes he was entitled to a further no. 12-51081 rounds’s first claim—that he never consented to any search of his on appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the united states v. girod, 646 f.3d 304, 318 (5th cir. 2011) (citation and internal avers that the evidence does not suggest that he pressured and persuaded jane cellphone—amounts to nothing more than a repetition of the factual argu- case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 3 date filed: 04/09/2014 vi. “so u sure u want to come back to me??” and “lol u like the nigga u with.” jane responded, ber registered to the iphone seized from rounds. as part of that analysis, she circumstantial and direct evidence. see united states v. terrell, 700 f.3d 755, in the united states court of appeals rounds challenges the search of his cellphone, claiming that (1) he never the district court denied rounds’s federal rule of criminal proce- “we review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” united states v. santiago, 410 f.3d produced five maps pertaining to phone calls made from and received by suppress. (5th cir. 2003). we consider any error to be harmless when “substantial evi- b. no. 12-51081 the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should the criminal sexual relationship. moreover, rounds sent jane at least one could have reasonably believed that rounds intended to coerce her to continue essence, rounds avers that consent cannot be voluntary either (a) because pol- elements. her. we, therefore, do not address the sufficiency of the evidence as to the first three case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 9 date filed: 04/09/2014 away from her. trahan’s testimony corroborates the phone call. united states v. lundy, 676 f.3d 444, 447 (5th cir. 2012), for example, we former classmate’s father saw her with rounds and told rounds she was fourteen. evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless-error analysis.” see united states v. gomez, 623 f.3d 265, 268 (5th cir. 2010). “a factual raises several issues on appeal, and we affirm. evidence in light of the delayed disclosure. or two, he could be suggesting that united states v. garcia mendoza, 587 f.3d 682, 686 (5th cir. 2009). where government emphasizes, that message was the “opening salvo,” by which the count two charges rounds with coercion and enticement in violation of or completion” of count two in the western district.11 to this end, count two right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant’s education and intelli- 1 in their initial conversations, jane asked rounds to get her a fake identification card no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” united states v. 6 see also united states v. goetzke, 494 f.3d 1231, 1235 n.3 (9th cir. 2007) (per curiam) 193, 197 (5th cir. 2005). finally, we review the evidence in the light most lawful arrest. rounds contends any evidence obtained was illegal fruit. she told rounds she was seventeen. she also testified about an incident in which one of her that they wanted to examine the phone for evidence of sexual exploitation of pursuant to consent, however, remains one of the well-settled exceptions to the vant. see kyles v. whitley, 514 u.s. 419, 432 (1995). agreed to drive to odessa and pick her up from a motel where she was staying. tasered her, and hit her, resulting in a ruptured eardrum. at some point in sheretta trahan, jane doe’s godmother; because she had not been previously have been committed.” u.s. const. amend. vi.9 to determine whether venue jane “practically had to beg him to get him to come” to odessa. rounds the government introduced several text messages between rounds and jane. rounds argues that he did not have an adequate opportunity to prepare sistent with every conclusion except guilt, so long as a reasonable trier of fact rounds’s third argument—that any search of a phone beyond the text be found. and arriving in odessa about 1:00 p.m. beginning at 12:20 a.m. on march 17, (3) because the arresting officers accessed more than merely his text-message rounds contends that the government violated brady when it failed to video, which was admitted as evidence, was of rounds and her having sex. 420, 436 (5th cir. 2002), considering the following non-exclusive six factors: the jury could have understood them in light of rounds and jane’s illegal sex- 3 messages or call records exceeds the scope of a search incident to a lawful woman later determined to be jane doe. jane’s testimony confirmed that the states v. beaumont, 972 f.2d 553, 563 (5th cir. 1992). finding that jane doe begged him to come get her from odessa.7 and, in any introduce tagged.com messages between jane doe and rounds. defense coun- 12 see united states v. caldwell, 16 f.3d 623, 625 (5th cir. 1994) (“[i]t was not in error have understood these messages as rounds’s attempt to control and continue stantial period of time. rounds does not challenge that. therefore, although the government presented extensive evidence demonstrating that no. 12-51081 5 engage in criminal sexual activity.4 focusing on the fourth element, rounds one of her former classmates saw her with rounds and told rounds that she 587–88 (5th cir. 2011). whether the prosecutor acted in good faith is not rele- proper in the western district of texas. third, he maintains that he did not march 17 traffic stop and produced a report for the iphone seized from rounds. case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 13 date filed: 04/09/2014 coercion, express or implied . . . .” united states v. mendenhall, 446 u.s. 544, trahan’s testimony and the admission of exhibit 14. after an hour’s delay in be 15 year[s] old.” similarly, in united states v. barlow, 568 f.3d 215, 219 (5th stituting the offense, we scrutinize the statute of conviction.” united states v. defendant, and (3) it was material.” united states v. brown, 650 f.3d 581, case; (f) the adequacy of the defense actually provided at trial; and no. 12-51081 pornography in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2252(a)(4) (count one) and using a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a juvenile judiced [the defendant’s] rights.” united states v. sanders, 343 f.3d 511, 519 the judgment of conviction is affirmed. rounds knew she was younger than eighteen.13 second, assuming rounds 510, 511 (5th cir. 2001). case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 1 date filed: 04/09/2014 record, however, contains other substantial evidence demonstrating that ii. cir. 2009), we affirmed the conviction, observing that the defendant “emailed law; and (4) he knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced jane to march 17. rounds to get her a fake identification card indicating that she was eighteen; at that time, munication with [jane] while she was in odessa.” a factual finding that we review for clear error, united states v. solis, 299 f.3d ruary 23, 2012. before running away, trahan asked jane to place a call to in early march, after she ran away from home, jane stayed approxi- social networking website tagged.com. she and rounds began texting. she standard is particularly strong because the judge had the opportunity to would have been exculpatory. the cellphone passcode and the time notation asking her via text, “u coming back or what?” shortly thereafter, rounds wrote, “i come get dure 29 motion, which challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence and single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force.” united states v. asibor, 109 f.3d consented to it, (2) even if he did, such consent was not voluntary, and his defense by disallowing him an opportunity to investigate. rounds can be ning, continuation, or completion of the crime.” united states v. fells, 78 f.3d heath hardwick, a special investigative agent for the department of (1) have probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will contacted a fourteen-year-old female (“jane doe”), living in houston, on the search uncovered a video that showed rounds having intercourse with a young the government needs to have put forward sufficient evidence showing that plaintiff–appellee, united states v. shaw, 920 f.2d 1225, 1230 (5th cir. 1991). we reverse a videos in his cellphone falls outside the scope of his consent. he did not make that argument contact.”). 14 rounds does not dispute any other aspect of the district court’s extensive discussion ment, it was entirely reasonable for the jury to look at the totality of the cir- the traffic stop. whitson stated that during the course of the stop he obtained rounds to jane, who was in odessa in that district; and (2) rounds’s presence the motion questions venue, we affirm the denial “if, viewing all the evidence indicating that she was eighteen years old. at that time, she told rounds she was seventeen. the location of the commission of the criminal acts.” united states v. contents of the phone without assistance from defendant,” rounds consented made him aware of her real age. first, she acknowledged that the father of a material witness testify at trial without adequate notice to the defense and united states v. walters, 351 f.3d 159, 170 (5th cir. 2003). trevin rounds was found guilty by a jury of being in possession of child prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements homeland security, testified as an expert in computer forensics, including cell mony, he needs to demonstrate that its admission substantially prejudiced his whitson also said that he seized a second cell phone—a flip phone that was who had not attained the age of 18 years to engage in sexual activity . . . .” 13 for example, jane doe testified that, in their initial conversations, she asked entice, or coerce a minor by sending the minor sexually explicit messages. in “have been voluntary and intelligent as to the sexually explicit videos since united states court of appeals that jane doe was younger than eighteen; (3) by engaging in sexual activity april 9, 2014 quotation marks omitted). “[f]or any of the evidentiary rulings to be reversible initially lied to rounds about her age1 but testified about several incidents that 2 finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record district court’s fact findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. [the minor] multiple pornographic pictures . . . [and] repeatedly asked her to to the search; and (2) “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances . . . [,] consent not favorable to him. the notes identifying jane doe similarly would not have preserved this issue, he has not provided any argument or authority demon- ual relationship. drawing every inference in favor of the verdict, a jury could in odessa on or about march 17. because the phone calls and text messages no. 12-51081 and numerous other text messages designed to have jane return to him, a jury before trial, rounds moved to suppress “any and all photographic and/or and call records, the full search exceeded the scope of a search incident to a similarly, the night before trial, the government disclosed its intent to in the district court and has not adequately briefed it on appeal, so it is waived. see united where, [rounds] did use a facility of interstate and foreign commerce, to wit: a (2) was aware of her age; and (3) used tagged.com and text messages to communicate with two outgoing calls to, and two calls from, jane’s number. day continuance and again delayed, for one day, the government’s introduction much of whitson’s. concluded that a rational jury could have found that the defendant enticed a phone or (b) because they asked to search his phone to find evidence of a differ- ments made during the suppression hearing and rejected by the district court. jerry e. smith, circuit judge: case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 12 date filed: 04/09/2014 consent to search the vehicle and rounds’s iphone, which was in the vehicle. number associated with jane doe, followed by two outgoing calls to jane’s iii. his cellphone; and (3) “the initial identifying information from the juvenile.” as a whole.” united states v. jacquinot, 258 f.3d 423, 427 (5th cir. 2001). case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 16 date filed: 04/09/2014 cumstances and conclude that rounds engaged in a coercive and enticing com- denial “only when the district court has abused its discretion and the defendant venue if he fails to raise the issue before trial. however, the issue is not waived if the trial 168, 171 (5th cir. 1996) (emphasis added). circumstantial evidence can suffi- case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 4 date filed: 04/09/2014 pression hearing, which revealed that the notes included (1) the passcode for phone.” the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which rounds and review only for plain error. see united states v. mares, 402 f.3d 511, 520 (5th be found in a particular place and (2) obtain a warrant. a search conducted around march 12, jane and rounds got into an argument about her talking to on by arousing hope or desire.’” (quoting webster’s third new international dictionary 11 eden (concho county) is in the northern district; odessa (ector county) is in the case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 11 date filed: 04/09/2014 ment is a question of fact for the jury to decide.” lundy, 676 f.3d at 450.6 even 166 (1939)). continuing offense10 is “any district in which such offense was begun, contin- at some point during the stop, whitson decided to take rounds and jane to crimes shall have been committed.” u.s. const. art. iii, § 2, cl. 3. “in all used a facility of interstate commerce to commit the offense; (2) he was aware send explicit pictures of herself” and that “the online conversations were usu- ally about sex . . . .”5 “whether there was inducement, persuasion, or entice- arrest—has no bearing on this case. the district court relied on the consent therefore urges that he cannot have persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced 8 see united states v. olvera, 687 f.3d 645, 647–48 (5th cir. 2012) (per curiam) (hold- from the evidence presented at trial, that the government established venue (g) the experience of the attorney with the accused. defendant voluntarily consented. id. we treat the voluntariness of consent as exception, not the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception.15 did not timely disclose exhibit 14. fourth, rounds avers that the government 15 after jane had sent rounds the address at the hotel in odessa) that she sent him a text states v. tompkins, 130 f.3d 117, 121 (5th cir. 1997). to rely on this exception, evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the rounds committed “any single act that was part of the beginning, continuation, unless the charged statute provides otherwise, a proper venue of a “[r]eviewing courts must affirm a conviction if, after viewing the ued, or completed.” 18 u.s.c. § 3237(a). accordingly, venue can be based on that the district court erred by allowing the government to introduce this venue as to count two. by moving for a judgment of acquittal at the close of (a) the amount of time available; (b) the defendant’s role in shortening jury could have understood the entire relationship. to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2422(b) (count two). he made the following findings: (1) because whitson “could not have viewed the alleges “on or about march 17, 2012, in the western district of texas and else- ciency of the evidence on count two. second, he contends venue was not video evidence that was gathered by the seizure and subsequent search of his 4 jane doe. the district court did not clearly err in determining that rounds other men online, including brian phea, who bought her a bus ticket from hou- beginning with the first theory, this court “review[s] a district court’s i. to investigate the government’s evidence. dence supports the same facts and inferences as those in the erroneously and the witness had answered his questions. although the court had delayed the police station, where whitson again looked through the iphone. this sexually laced text message and phone conservations with a girl he thought to ice officers did not inform him for what purpose they wished to search his vides no reason why the court clearly erred. you.” next, after asking jane whether she trusted rounds or phea, rounds wrote, “so go let 8 section 2422(b) constitutes a continuing offense. see united states v. ernment called trahan to prove that rounds knew jane doe’s age. the trial 12 demonstrate only that rounds consented to the search of his cellphone, a fact clerk first, assuming rounds has challenged the admission of trahan’s testi- trevin rounds, stitute acts that were part of the completion of count two, the government analysis. she testified that she had performed an analysis on the phone num- failed to disclose brady material2 when it did not provide the defense a copy of f.3d 417, 423 (5th cir. 1994). in assessing whether the court abused its discre- rights. even assuming he could somehow show that the court abused its dis- cellular telephone, to knowingly persuade, induce, and entice an individual no. 12-51081 minor in light of the fact that he “made contact with and engaged in a string of f.3d at 219 n.10 (5th cir. 2009) (“to be clear, the statute does not require that the sexual tion, this court considers the “totality of the circumstances,” including no. 12-51081 “the trial of all crimes . . . shall be held in the state where the said for appeal.3 helped him. the brady claim has no merit. 272–73 (5th cir. 2005). “to establish a brady violation, the defendant must by a preponderance of the evidence.” id. could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” id. shortly before trial, the government indicated that it planned to call that he was “ready to go forward” as to both the testimony and the admission question we consider de novo. united states v. garza-lopez, 410 f.3d 268, not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be completely incon- in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could conclude, 1023, 1031 (5th cir. 1997) (quoting united states v. midstate horticultural co., 306 u.s. 161, byrne, 171 f.3d 1231, 1235 n.2 (10th cir. 1999). for proper venue, therefore, without adequate notice to the defense. rounds similarly complains that the no. 12-51081 the witness from testifying for another day, because counsel told the court “i’m where a court has based its denial on live testimony, “the clearly erroneous erred in denying his motion to suppress. consented to the search and that the consent was voluntarily given. sent on or about march 17 to the minor who was in the western district con- the start of the trial, defense counsel confirmed multiple times on the record jane to engage in criminal sexual activity. in contrast, the government con- no. 12-51081 557 (1980). with jane, he could have been charged with a criminal offense under texas of that evidence. again, defense counsel indicated that he was ready to go [the arresting officers’] discussion was directed to the issue of narcotics.”14 in defendant–appellant. fourth amendment’s warrant and probable-cause requirements. united message asking him to answer his phone because phea had assaulted her. v. van velkinburgh, 342 f. app’x 939, 941 (5th cir. 2009); united states v. farner, 251 f.3d the government points to two ways to establish venue in the western 187 (5th cir. 1974). rodriguez-moreno, 526 u.s. 275, 279 (1999). “to identify the conduct con- provide the defense with a copy of the notes that maritz made the night of the court erred by not granting him another continuance to give him more time if the defendant does not explicitly reference sex in his communications, a jury rounds and jane doe. rounds claims that the untimely disclosure prejudiced iv. have an adequate opportunity to prepare for trial because the government had for the trial judge to find venue in the district in which the calls were received.”); united prove that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) it was favorable to the rounds’s initial arrest. maritz used the notes during her testimony at the sup- is appropriate, we perform a two-step inquiry: “[a] court must initially identify admitted evidence.” united states v. el-mezain, 664 f.3d 467, 526 (5th cir. having a sexual relationship with him. there is sufficient evidence on many of the text messages from rounds do not appear to be sexually explicit, the government’s case and at the close of all the evidence and by requesting contrary to rounds’s suggestion, the trial record does not compel the being used by jane—from rounds’s vehicle. maritz’s testimony corroborated forward. jenkins, 46 f.3d 447, 451 (5th cir. 1995) (quoting bumper v. north carolina, appeal from the united states district court “u not talking to me no more?” it was not until hours later on the morning of march 17 (and can establish that he suffered serious prejudice.” united states v. castro, 15 to come with him. according to rounds, the record instead demonstrates that was fourteen. second, she ran away from her godmother’s house on feb- the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 203 f. app’x 613, 618 (5th cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“a defendant may waive his objection to rounds has not shown error, plain or otherwise. even if the government 13 ward. see united states v. green, 272 f.3d 748, 754 (5th cir. 2001). under either theory. and, in fact, the record reveals that the officers told him odessa, jane wanted to get away from phea and return to houston; rounds arrived in amarillo, she and phea went to odessa, where phea was abusive, 7 after a few days of jane’s returning to odessa, rounds initiated the conversation by a traffic violation. whitson testified that he and his partner, maritz, conducted for the western district of texas can find that he intended to induce, persuade, entice, or coerce the minor based 5 see also united states v. broussard, 669 f.3d 537, 550 (5th cir. 2012); united states the following evidence was presented at trial: in february 2012, rounds rounds during which trahan told rounds that jane was fourteen and to stay 18 u.s.c. § 2422(b), which requires the government to prove that (1) rounds and (2) delayed her testimony for one day. an hour later, counsel informed the case: 12-51081 document: 00512591149 page: 7 date filed: 04/09/2014


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