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State of Kansas v Bruce

Case No. 105,884 (KS S.Ct., Nov. 2, 2012)

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the district judge's suppression of evidence derived from a wiretap. We transferred the case from the Court of Appeals on our own motion and now affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND



This case began December 10, 2009, when then Attorney General Steve Six signed the following written delegation of authority to then Assistant Attorney General Barry Disney:

"I, Steve Six, the duly elected Attorney General of the State of Kansas, do hereby delegate the authority to exercise the power of the Attorney General to make application for ex parte orders authorizing the interception of wire, oral or electronic communication pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2515, et seq. to Barry Disney, Assistant Attorney General.

"This delegation of authority to exercise the power of the Attorney General to make application for ex parte orders authorizing the interception of wire, oral or electronic communication is made under the authority of K.S.A. 75-710 and shall remain in effect until revoked by me in writing."


Less than 3 weeks later, Disney appeared before District Court Judge Cheryl Rios Kingfisher in Shawnee County "for Attorney General Steve Six . . . pursuant to K.S.A. 75-710" and applied "for an order authorizing interception of wire communications and electronic communications pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2516." The wiretap was to assist in a drug investigation, and the application was based on information provided by a Kansas Bureau of Investigation special agent. Judge Kingfisher issued an order authorizing the requested interception.

The investigation led to this prosecution of defendant Charles Elmer Bruce, Jr., in Neosho County on one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of possession of pseudoephedrine. Bruce sought suppression of all evidence derived from the wiretap, arguing that the order was unlawful.
 

 

Judge(s): Carol A. Beier
Jurisdiction: Kansas Supreme Court
Related Categories: Communications , Constitutional Law
 
Supreme Court Judge(s)
Carol Beier
Dan Biles
Lee Johnson
Marla Luckert
Nancy Moritz
Lawton Nuss
Eric Rosen

 
Trial Court Judge(s)
Timothy Brazil

 
Appellant Lawyer(s) Appellant Law Firm(s)
Lee Davidson Office of the Kansas Attorney General
Derek Schmidt Office of the Kansas Attorney General

 
Appellee Lawyer(s) Appellee Law Firm(s)
Carl Folsom, III Bell Folsom PA
Jeb Griebat Griebat Law Office

 

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language ambiguous, court may construe statute by consulting legislative history, canons here. the omnibus crime control and safe streets act of 1968, 18 u.s.c. § 2515 (2006) et form letter of designation, which would amount to nothing more than a standing order analysis see also united states v. giordano, 416 u.s. 505, 514, 515, 94 s. ct. 1820, 40 l. ed. 2d electronic communications pursuant to k.s.a. 22-2516." the wiretap was to assist in a kansas' version of the federal statute's subsections is identical in all significant bell folsom, p.a., of lawrence, was with him on the brief for appellee. application. the statute makes no distinction between 'authorizing' and 'applying.'" rejected a distinction between "authorization" and "application" that would allow for parties did not dispute that the assistant had filed the application in the county attorney's southwestern bell tel. co., 279 kan. 976, 978, 113 p.3d 258 [2005]). "'when a statute is the state no longer argues that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule we begin with a brief review of the statutes at the heart of this case, as well as our suppression decision by a substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal in effect until revoked by me in writing." "no area of the law is more sensitive than that of electronic surveillance, since persons designated by the legislature to apply for an eavesdropping or intercepting 04. the political process the formation of policy on electronic surveillance" express objective in olander, an assistant county attorney had applied for the order in issue. the (2) "six specifically delegated his authority to disney in writing for the purpose of v. of construction, other background considerations that shed light on statute's purpose). our interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication," the state's argument was that federal wiretap restrictions on the identities or positions of the state prosecutors "[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the a court-created exception to what was already a court-created remedy designed to deter circuit court of appeals approach). the violation here, on the other hand, was statutory; 7 those authorized by act; "congress . . . evinced the clear intent to make doubly sure that something that is not found in the plain words used by the legislature . . . .'" state v. to seek wiretap order extended to the united states "attorney general, deputy attorney 4 2616(2) (2006) and thus preempted. a wiretap order obtained under such a delegation supreme court of minnesota had noted the absence of assistant county attorneys in the make application for ex parte orders authorizing the interception of wire, oral or counterpart. finally, the state sought to rely on the leon good-faith exception. powers as prescribed by law and shall perform other duties as prescribed by the attorney see 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2). state statutes that are more permissive than federal law are mandated by supreme judicial court in vitello "calls for far more protection than a mere cert. denied 426 u.s. 949 (1976), and in re olander, 213 kan. 282, 515 p.2d 1211 followed on the delegation and the wiretap application. after briefing and argument, responsibilities and, since 2005, includes the following language: of electronic bugging devices to a very select coterie of public officers." olander, 213 state v. willis, 7 kan. app. 2d 413, 414, 643 p.2d 1112 (1982) (late mailing of authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 8 kingfisher in shawnee county "for attorney general steve six . . . pursuant to k.s.a. authorization or approval." 18 u.s.c. § 2518(10)(a) (2006). (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; permissive than 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2)'s listing and thus the wiretaps were obtained (approving statute permitting special designation with addition of court-specified this interlocutory appeal and transfer from the court of appeals followed. beier, j.: in this interlocutory appeal, the state challenges the district judge's both the federal and state statutes also provide for motions to suppress wiretap area of wiretaps seems an especially poor environment for judicial policy making. we pointed out. see olander, 213 kan. at 283; farha, 218 kan. at 395. the statute then 2 state of kansas, "the attorney general, district attorney or county attorney may make an application to from it. the violation in this case ran afoul of a provision intended to play a "i, steve six, the duly elected attorney general of the state of kansas, do hereby incorporate search and seizure law as it existed 16 years before leon decided; title iii (6th cir. 2007) (rejecting three other federal circuit courts of appeals' application of this question requires a predicate evaluation of whether judge brazil correctly determined statutory construction necessary if language of statute plain and unambiguous; if the statutory authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant attorney general must bring the wiretap application to the attorney general for review the wiretap order. congress' will has been expressed in "reasonably plain terms," and we 5 application before it was submitted to the court. applies to save admission of the wiretap evidence here. it recognizes that leon sets forth attorney general among the prosecutors able to apply for a wiretap order was more federal statute on state wiretaps. see olander, 213 kan. at 287 (quoting state v. frink, rule argument; availability of suppression remedy for wiretap violation turns on technicalities; they are at the heart of the congressional scheme. . . . the procedures wiretap application. defendant bruce has established a violation of federal wiretap law. kansas statutes contain the same suppression requirement when wiretap evidence has derived from the wiretap must be suppressed. "contain some type of special designation language or some language that the assistant 3 2012. affirmed. k.s.a. 2011 supp. 75-710 and k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2515. the state also relied on snellings, 294 kan. 149, 157, 273 p.3d 739 (2012) (quoting farmers ins. co. v. jeb c. griebat, of griebat law office, of chanute, argued the cause, and carl folsom, iii, of "this delegation of authority to exercise the power of the attorney general to department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the united states, a 9 1974). although the language of k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2515(a)(1)-(20) now lists "[t]he under the federal statute, extraordinary investigative device"); see also united states v. rice, 478 f.3d 704, 712-14 in farha, we examined wiretaps authorized by a district court upon application of measures establishing parameters); see also smith, 726 f.2d at 857-58 (procedure authorized to seek an order. see farha, 218 kan. at 400-01; olander, 213 kan. at 283- leon; title iii contains no exceptions to exclusion; legislative history expresses desire to provision of the wiretap statutes, exclusion is required by both the federal and state the statutes and our cases and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement § 2515 et seq. and kansas wiretap statutes that largely mirror the federal provisions. 2515(a)(1)-(20), is more permissive than the applicable federal wiretap statute, 18 u.s.c. centralization and accountability," because, at a minimum, any delegation statute must conflicting decisions on whether principal prosecuting attorney's power to apply for a oral or electronic communication by an investigative or law enforcement officer and an assistant attorney general. we held that k.s.a. 22-2513(1)'s listing of an assistant wiretap order. the state also argued that the cases relied upon by bruce dealt specifically 6 bureau of investigation special agent. judge kingfisher issued an order authorizing the suppression. general (the principal prosecuting attorney of the state) is authorized to make the court order for interception. under 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2), the state conceded at oral argument that the answer to each of the first two application is made when such interception may provide evidence of the commission of vindicated in spite of the violation and chooses to knit the state a safety net that the "'title iii has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral for suppression § 34.10 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing federal circuit split, advocating sixth "the difficulty with this contention is that under 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2) only the attorney impermissible because of a conflict between the two statutes and legislative history thus maintain the position of our earlier cases: when there is a violation of a central legislature omitted. postinterception inventory does not require suppression under k.s.a. 22-2516[9][a]). farha, 218 kan. at 400-03. if so, the parties continue to differ on whether exclusion of should be sufficient for the attorney general to have authorized and approved the bruce also raises several alternative grounds for upholding the district judge's 2515(a)" and that "k.s.a. 75-710[,] as applied with k.s.a. 22-2515[,] is more permissive of federal law); olander, 213 kan. at 285; cf. united states v. donovan, 429 u.s. 413, question three: preservation of purpose and harmless error drug investigation, and the application was based on information provided by a kansas statutory scheme was not too permissive to pass muster when compared with its federal on the third question, the state asserts that the delegation from six to disney, olander and farha remain evergreen and applicable here. question one: existence of violation name and with his express authority, but this court nevertheless ruled that the statute's wiretaps pose to personal privacy, authorizing statutes must be strictly construed. (1st cir. 1984); vitello, 367 mass. at 230-33, appx. at 253-58. syllabus by the court law enforcement violation of constitutional rights. see giordano, 416 u.s. at 524, 527 applications for wiretaps in the kansas court system are subject to both 18 u.s.c labor, 292 kan. 17, 22, 248 p.3d 1287 (2011) (quoting casco v. armour swift-eckrich, on the grounds that— extent the attorney general delegates them the authority to do so." authority to an assistant county attorney, saying that the statute was amend or expand the powers granted to the attorney general pursuant to k.s.a. 22- (1) "the six administration established a procedure for handling wiretap applications"; the kansas counterpart to 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2) on "the principal prosecuting accountability, and would constitute an abdication of responsibility"). but the sensitive see state v. johnson, 293 kan. 1, 4, 259 p.3d 719 (2011). omission of "assistant county attorney" from the list of prosecutors who could apply for k.s.a. 2011 supp. 75-710, when read in conjunction with k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22- of this chapter and with the applicable state statute an order authorizing, or approving the in the supreme court of the state of kansas 10 evidence exclusion. see 18 u.s.c. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a); k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2515; the judgment of the district court is affirmed. may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title iii prohibits all wiretapping political subdivision is considerably narrower than an alternate federal statute governing sufficiently safeguarded the purposes behind the federal wiretap statutory scheme. see and both the federal and state statutory schemes include their own, explicit remedies of three questions that guide the analysis and outcome in this case. k.s.a. 2011 assistant attorney general in criminal division, national security division). the intended to play a central role, was its purpose achieved in spite of the violation and thus but this reading of k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2515(a)(1)-(20) and k.s.a. 2011 supp. (1973); and he argued that application of k.s.a. 2011 supp. 75-710 to broaden an 75-710" and applied "for an order authorizing interception of wire communications and state." as the state has now implicitly recognized through its oral argument concessions, 296 minn. 57, 75, 206 n.w.2d 664 [1973]). our olander opinion did not address today's general. assistants shall act for and exercise the power of the attorney general to the 710 only allows special designation by the attorney general to assistant attorneys § 2516(2). assistant attorney general, any deputy assistant attorney general or acting deputy 1 class designated by the kansas legislature. at oral argument before this court, counsel for the state suggested that analysis of [certain listed offenses (1)-(19)]; or (20) any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing objectives of 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2), which are . . . policy uniformity and political further question of whether the statutory suppression remedy could be avoided on any supp. 75-710 on the powers and duties of assistants and employees of the kansas interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications by investigative or law 12 wiretap-specific statutes. frustrating the twin congressional objectives of policy uniformity and political arnett, 290 kan. 41, syl. ¶ 1, 223 p.3d 780 (2010) (intent of legislature governs; no bruce counters that the six-disney delegation process failed "to meet the and only after authorization of a court order obtained after a showing and finding of the opinion of the court was delivered by therefore regard the language of 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2) as conclusive. see in re m.f., 290 shared our reticence about legislating. see vitello, 367 mass. at 230-33, appx. at 253-58 2515(a)(1)-(20) to permit the kansas attorney general to delegate the power to apply for surveillance—we think no such distinction should be made. in kansas the attorney statutes or whether the violation is subject to some sort of harmlessness analysis. number of persons in kansas who may obtain a wiretap order is limited only by the our resolution of it, see annot., 169 a.l.r. fed. 169, § 8[b], [c], pp. 193-96 (citing central); united states v. chavez, 416 u.s. 562, 564-65, 94 s. ct. 1849, 40 l. ed. 2d 380 evidence in any trial . . . in or before any court . . . or other authority of the united states, olander and farha, the two previous cases from this court upon which the parties in farha, we addressed the goals of the federal wiretap statutory scheme: order," because "k.s.a. 22-2515 does not allow an assistant attorney general to make the attorney general—will clearly eliminate any possible after-the-fact question as to statutes does nothing to undercut these cases' recognition of the preemptive effect of this case should ask and answer three questions: first, has defendant bruce established a authorization provisions of the wiretap statutory scheme as "central." see giordano, 416 this ultimate holding eschewing harmlessness analysis implicitly rejects the and state statutes, eliminating the need for suppression of the wiretap evidence. we 22-2513(1) was more permissive than 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2) in that it purported to in farha, we further emphasized that the "authorization requirements are not mere communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions no. 105,884 the application is made, when such interception may provide or has provided evidence of 283 kan. 508, 521, 154 p.3d 494 [2007]). we acknowledge that other courts have not than 18 u.s.c. 2516(2)[;] therefore, the application and order authorizing interception are power equal to that of the attorney general to apply for a wiretap order"; (4) "k.s.a. 75- 435-36, 97 s. ct. 658, 50 l. ed. 2d 652 (1977) (information on additional targets not that k.s.a. 2011 supp. 75-710, when read in conjunction with k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22- intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme? and, third, if the provision was question two: violation implication of central provision violates a central provision of the federal statutory scheme, and the evidence obtained or barry disney: neosho county on one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and one permitted "the attorney general, an assistant attorney general, or a county attorney" to agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense regarding which the 75-710 is preempted by the plain language of 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2), which allows no such by lower echelon officials"; "centraliz[ation] in a publicly responsible official subject to violation of federal wiretap law? second, did any violation run afoul of a provision according to the plain language of k.s.a. 2011 supp. 75-710, the only limitations (2003); see in re m.f., 290 kan. 142, 150-51, 225 p.3d 1177 (2010). because of the risk the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under united states v. leon, 468 u.s. judge brazil suppressed the wiretap evidence, holding that "k.s.a. 75-710 does not on the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of fourth n.e.2d 819 [1975]); see 18 u.s.c. § 2515. provisions of statute). if the statutorily provided remedy of suppression is to be foregone basis. 2011 supp. 75-710. on delegation by a kansas attorney general to an assistant attorney general are the extent pointing to a contrary intention. bruce also asserted that the kansas statutory scheme for safeguard[]"; "centralization ensures that wiretap applications not be approved routinely central role in the statutory scheme. been obtained in violation of explicit safeguards. see k.s.a. 22-2517. insufficient on its face; or motion. at one of the hearings, six and disney testified about the procedure they signed the following written delegation of authority to then assistant attorney general appellee. delegation of wiretap order applications by "the principal prosecuting attorney of any affirm the district court decision that the assistant attorney general could not legally apply delegation by the attorney general to an assistant attorney general. 218 kan. at 403-04. approach to the interpretation of federal statutes is the same, in the absence of an decisions in olander and farha. according to bruce's motion to suppress, disney was not "within the class of district court judge timothy e. brazil held two hearings on bruce's suppression the first: has defendant bruce established a violation of federal wiretap law? answering probable cause.'" 218 kan. at 399 (quoting 1968 u.s. code cong. and admin. news, s. the standard of review for the interpretation of kansas statutes is well known. see statute, it also quoted the language in the tandem federal statute, and it observed that the of appeals on our own motion and now affirm. such an application." bruce cited state v. farha, 218 kan. 394, 544 p.2d 341 (1975), 11 federal wiretap statute expressly references the delegation of power by the united states one other kansas statute has the potential to complicate the answers to the electronic communication is made under the authority of k.s.a. 75-710 and shall remain assemblies, including the congress, have carefully restricted the right to apply for the use again, by its oral argument concessions, the state has implicitly recognized a wiretap order to an assistant attorney general is more permissive than 18 u.s.c. § the state argues this is precisely what should happen. in its view, despite the most significant here, both the federal and kansas statutes safeguard the privacy attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of attorney" of the state is k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2515(a)(1)-(20). it reads in pertinent part: outlined in 18 u.s.c. § 2516 must be strictly complied with . . . ." 218 kan. at 403. we at the time, the state argued in response that k.s.a. 2011 supp. 75-710 permitted therefore discuss at somewhat greater length the parties' contrary positions and our authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, conclusion drawn from those factual findings by a de novo standard. the court does not derived from the wiretap, arguing that the order was unlawful. such an order conclusively required suppression. olander, 213 kan. at 283-85. we that state to make application to a state court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order scheme. given these concessions, we do not engage in an extensive discussion on these factual and procedural background play central role); farha, 218 kan. at 402-03 (preapplication authorization "[c]rucial . . . despite its violation of a central provision, achieved the protective purposes of the federal prior to filing the wiretap application." see united states v. smith, 726 f.2d 852, 856-59 "assistants appointed by the attorney general shall perform the duties and exercise the the attorney general to specially designate an assistant attorney general to apply for a (repealed 1974), and did not control the interpretation of the current interaction between less than 3 weeks later, disney appeared before district court judge cheryl rios officers engaged in the investigation or prevention of specified types of serious crimes, two points. applications for wiretaps by united states prosecutors. see 18 u.s.c. § 2516(1) (power number of assistant attorneys general and county attorneys in existence at the particular the continuing force of our precedent on this point. we do not choose to depart with the validity of a prior version of the kansas statute, see k.s.a. 1972 supp. 22-2513 15 wiretaps does not comport with congress' intent). general can appoint as many assistant attorneys general as he may deem necessary contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in appellant, general"; (5) "an assistant attorney general only has authority if specifically granted by facts, however, the suppression question is solely one of law. [citation omitted.]" state v. 897, 104 s. ct. 3405, 82 l. ed. 2d 677 (1984), because suppression was required by (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 14 fatally defective and the evidence thereby was unlawfully intercepted." congress "preempted the field of electronic surveillance regulation under its power to statute must be held invalid as in conflict with the federal act." farha, 218 kan. at 403- keeping in mind the expressed objectives of title iii—to centralize in a publicly attorney general, district attorney or county attorney," the principles enunciated in of potential subjects of wiretaps by listing the specific state prosecutors who may seek a prosecuting attorney who is listed by federal statute as the officer who "may apply" for decisions from the federal courts and other state courts that interpreted 18 u.s.c. § for ex parte orders authorizing the interception of wire, oral or electronic communication seq. finally, he argued that admissibility of the wiretap evidence could not be saved by kan. at 125; farha, 218 kan. at 399, 403-04. the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications."). by enacting title iii, we agree that asking and answering these questions is exactly what is called for regulate interstate communications," allowing concurrent state regulation only if "subject, this provision singling out "the principal prosecuting attorney" of any state or general, was with him on the briefs for appellant. offenses." questions was "yes." in other words, there has been a violation of federal wiretap law, responsible official subject to the political process the formation of policy on electronic under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. to "any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, such activity intrudes into the very heart of personal privacy. there it is that legislative would first be approved by six"; (3) "an assistant attorney general is not given permanent in addition, when reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, pursuant to k.s.a. 22-2515, et seq. to barry disney, assistant attorney general. at the minimum, to the requirements of the federal regulation." farha, 218 kan. at 400; on identification of person excused); united states v. foy, 641 f.3d 455, 462-64 (10th "[t]he principal prosecuting attorney of any state, or the principal prosecuting kan. at 150-51; see also farha, 218 kan. at 404 (delegation of state authority to apply for although olander focused primarily on the exclusive wording of the kansas suppression of evidence derived from a wiretap. we transferred the case from the court general, associate attorney general, any assistant attorney general, any acting 2516(2) (2006) to permit delegation under certain circumstances. in its view, the kansas 16 statutes. 18 u.s.c. § 2518(10)(a)(i); k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2516(9)(a); see dowdy, 222 a state, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in decision to suppress the evidence stemming from the wiretap in this case. because we the evidence derived from the wiretap is absolutely necessary under the federal and state kan. at 285. rather than determine what the law should or should not be.'" hill v. kansas dept. of 425 (1977) (citing giordano, 416 u.s. 505) (pre-leon; no merit in state's exclusionary attorney general grants him or her broad authority to delegate performance of "this court generally reviews the factual findings underlying the district court's under united states v. leon, 468 u.s. 897, 104 s. ct. 3405, 82 l. ed. 2d 677 (1984), reweigh the evidence. [citation omitted.] when the parties do not dispute the material authorizing wiretaps could not be more permissive than the federal scheme, title iii of and the violation implicated a provision intended to play a central role in the statutory preempted. 218 kan. at 400 (quoting commonwealth v. vitello, 367 mass. 224, 250, 327 (1974) (when actual authorization of application performed by correct person, facial flaw this case began december 10, 2009, when then attorney general steve six our usual practice is to apply the letter of clear statutes without grafting new, count of possession of pseudoephedrine. bruce sought suppression of all evidence make an application for a wiretap order. see l. 1970, ch. 129, sec. 22-2513(1) (repealed coleman, 292 kan. 813, 817, 257 p.3d 320 (2011). the violation harmless? illegally. farha, 218 kan. at 401-04. again, we rejected the state's argument that it here, it must be because this court deems the goals of the federal wiretap statute resolution. state, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is respects. see k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2516(9)(a). of the attorney general's own authority and the outer parameters of the delegation itself. the central question in this appeal at the time it was transferred to this court was 86. although we appreciate that not every court confronting this issue would agree with cir. 2011) (mere technical defect in wiretap application does not require suppression); intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this state's subsidiary argument that the specific procedures and delegation document used the investigation led to this prosecution of defendant charles elmer bruce, jr., in official subject to the political process[,]' as the gatekeeper for this wiretap application." judge brazil was correct in ruling that disney was not authorized to submit the k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2516(9)(a); see also state v. dowdy, 222 kan. 118, 125, 563 p.2d rejected the state's argument that the county attorney could delegate his statutory any judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing the interception of a wire, requested interception. for a wiretap authorization, we need not reach these alternative arguments. "intended to limit strictly the class of persons who may apply for an order permitting "otherwise binding court ruling." purvis v. williams, 276 kan. 182, 187, 73 p.3d 740 olander, 213 kan. at 287. delegate the authority to exercise the power of the attorney general to make application 13 electronic surveillance, and . . . an assistant county attorney does not come within the oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, u.s. at 528 (supreme court "confident" provision for preapplication approval intended to amendment rights, but upon the provisions of title iii"; "congress intended to require the commission of [certain listed offenses], designated in any applicable state statute violation of a central provision, adequate safeguards for bruce's privacy existed because: state v. roberts, 293 kan. 29, 33, 259 p.3d 691 (2011) (unlimited review); state v. attorney general. 18 u.s.c. § 2516(1). balanced social costs, benefits differently in wiretap context); see also 4 fishman and authorize an assistant attorney general to make application for a wiretap order, our state rep. 1097, 90th congress, 2d session, pp. 2112, 2153). time. . . . strictly circumscribing this authority to that stated in the federal act—in kansas here would have met the standard for application of a court-created exception to both the united states supreme court and this court have identified the limited appeal from neosho district court; timothy e. brazil, judge. opinion filed november 2, wiretap order may be delegated), we see no reason to depart from our precedent on this charles elmer bruce, jr., making application for wiretap orders with the understanding that any such applications enforcement officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which evidence in certain circumstances. the federal statute states: (citing 18 u.s.c. § 2518[10][a][i]) (suppression of evidence from wiretaps "does not turn (k.s.a. 75-3111). we cannot perceive congress intended that at any given time the the attorney general"; and (6) "the procedure . . . maintained six, a 'publicly responsible suppression where there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that because k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2515(a)(1)-(20) allows the attorney general to "make an offenses." focus, did examine an earlier version of k.s.a. 22-2515(a)(1)-(20), as the state has the fact that olander and farha were focused on an earlier version of kansas' wiretap the attorney general may lawfully authorize an assistant to do the same under k.s.a. plain and unambiguous, we must give effect to the legislature's intention as expressed, alternative issues court-created rules onto them to rescue violators. "'a statute should not be read to add directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of application to any judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing the 17 lee j. davidson, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and derek schmidt, attorney 341 (1974) (the purpose of title iii "effectively to prohibit" all interceptions except our third question asks whether the kansas delegation procedure used in this case violation of this chapter." 18 u.s.c. § 2515 (2006). point at this time. for wiretaps originating in a state court, it is only the principal mckenna, wiretapping and eavesdropping: surveillance in the internet age, grounds identifiable individual responsibility for the application. inasmuch as k.s.a. 1971 supp. assistant attorney general's authority under k.s.a. 2011 supp. 22-2515 was


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