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State of Iowa v Pargo

Case No. 2-050 (IA Ct. App., Mar. 28, 2012)

William Pargo challenges the constitutionality of the warranted search of his house on the east side of Des Moines, as well as the consent search of a motel room where he was staying. These searches yielded evidence used to convict him in two separate drug prosecutions.

We find the district court properly denied Pargo’s motion to suppress the evidence from both searches. Contrary to Pargo’s claim on appeal, the officers did not exceed the scope of his consent when looking for crack cocaine and a firearm above a ceiling tile in the motel bathroom. As for the search warrant, we reject Pargo’s pro se claim that the warrant lacked probable cause because the confidential informant had not previously supplied information to assist police. The warrant application contained credible independent evidence corroborating the informant’s statements. We also find no merit in Pargo’s pro se claim that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to corroborate his confessions of drug dealing.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings



A. Polk County Case No. FECR234743



Des Moines police officers executed a search warrant for a residence located at 1549 Des Moines Street on January 22, 2010. When the search team reached the house, Pargo opened the side door, leaning out to see who was approaching. Execution of the warrant was complicated by an electric company’s work at the address, which had shut down the power lines to the house.
 

 

Judge(s): Mary Tabor
Jurisdiction: Iowa Court of Appeals
Trial Court Judge(s)
Scott Rosenberg

 
Court of Appeals Judge(s)
Michael Mullins
Mary Tabor
Anuradha Vaitheswaran

 
Appellant Lawyer(s) Appellant Law Firm(s)
John Audlehelm Audlehelm Law Office
William Pargo Pro Se

 
Appellee Lawyer(s) Appellee Law Firm(s)
Bridget Chambers Office of the Iowa Attorney General
Thomas Miller Office of the Iowa Attorney General
Steven Bayens Office of the Polk County Attorney
John Sarcone Office of the Polk County Attorney

 

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receptacle, which tested positive for illicit substances. whether the informant’s sold drugs, he eventually admitted to acting as a “middle man” in transactions at with a crack house, where individuals visit to buy, sell, or use controlled we find the district court properly denied pargo’s motion to suppress the house, probable cause existed to issue the search warrant, even if the 21 basement stairs at the time of the warrant’s execution, had a crack pipe, brillo drugs[, and because the defendant] consented to a search for 20 physical build, height, age, and race matched pargo’s characteristics. detective found the contraband and pargo’s wallet within two feet of each other above the in the morning, before execution of the warrant. although initially denying he includes not only the language authorizing consent, but also any gestures and his rights under the fourth amendment. in its suppression ruling, the court held manager of the motel, who informed them “duke” secured the room using his the state’s evidence need not prove pargo was acting as a principal to thornton was not wearing socks when the officer seized him. when he was taken substance violations from 1989 to 2008 in minnesota and an arrest in april 2009 pargo acquiesced to officer gilmore’s request to “take a look around.” the fourth amendment assures “[t]he right of the people to be secure in whether a party had the authority to consent, and whether the consent was immediately after the defendant admitted to smoking marijuana, the defendant “sosa,” driving a white cadillac, from whom the informant was able to purchase arrests, as to confidential informant the same evidentiary precautions as confessions. id. (quotation omitted). as our attachment “b” to detective nicolino’s warrant related to the confidential things to be seized and the place to be searched”). is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. however, the “other proof” see id. at 756–57. has been committed and which as a whole proves [the defendant] officers did not imply any limitation to the consent. in addition to telling the corroboration need not be strong nor need it go to the whole case we agree with the tenth circuit’s conclusion that a person who is aware of law attachment “a” to the application, he describes his contact with a confidential action was unreasonable and in contravention of the fourth amendment iii. analysis motel room. but he was on the same notice as pena when he consented to the a reasonable person to believe his agreement contained no such limitation. 765 (iowa 1989). he also had an opportunity to exercise that right—he was in [ x ] the informant’s past information has helped supply the basis these facts corroborate pargo’s statements that he was the middle man so long as it confirms some material fact connecting the defendant himself as a police officer. the three officers waited two to four minutes, essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their selling drugs from a hotel room. officers knocked on the door, informed pena were individually wrapped in roughly equal amounts. address whether pargo’s consent to search the motel room extends to the space c. the search of room 209 did not excede the scope of pargo’s truth. subsequent revocation of consent is ineffective). because there is no evidence doubt or even by a preponderance. other independent evidence of pargo’s residence detective nicolino turned the conversation to pargo’s knowledge of the the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” viewed in the light most meyers, 799 n.w.2d at 139. the state charged pargo with one count of possession of crack cocaine with just shuffling around, people either getting dressed or moving things around.”3 tabor, j. pipe in the same bed as they found austin. basement officers missed due to the power outage. (“the confession of the defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a william pargo appeals his convictions for possession with intent to deliver individuals from state action as well. state v. freeman, 705 n.w.2d 293, 297 unreliable. he also alleges the affidavit contained false statements made across in his nineteen years on the force. determined when officers entered the names in their database. while they were state failed to offer sufficient evidence to corroborate his confessions of drug based on the convictions and enhancements, the court sentenced pargo to thirty living with them for two weeks. pargo also permitted others to stay at his house officer gilmore knocked on the outer door of room 209 and identified sellers and buyers. the dealers compensated him for his services with a share scenario before the tenth circuit in united states v. pena, 143 f.3d 1363, 1365 the informant’s statements. we also find no merit in pargo’s pro se claim that the statements, alleging the district court improperly deprived him of a franks federal constitution. we review claimed constitutional violations “de novo in light case no. fecr234743 6 probable cause nevertheless existed to issue the warrant. the motel room. because counsel is not expected to raise a meritless issue, a search premised on the defendant’s consent allows police to search officer crowdis heard no movement. socks, at which point the crack cocaine fell to the ground. same, focusing our analysis on whether the officers unreasonably invaded a warrant based upon facts supplied by a confidential informant is crack cocaine to support his own drug use. during his visit with detective 209 possessed crack cocaine and a firearm. the officers spoke with the william antwayn pargo, officers to search only his personal effects in room 209. he continues that even nicolino the department’s previous search of his house failed to recover ten jimeno, 500 u.s. 248, 251, 111 s. ct. 1801, 1803–04, 114 l. ed. 2d 297, 302 to his thirty-year sentence in fecr234743. pargo appeals both convictions. inculpatory evidence. see id. (holding once incriminating evidence is found, agreed to talk, admitting the wallet was his, but denying ownership of the gun knocking several times, and could hear movement inside the room. officer as a second or subsequent offender and habitual offender and possession with pargo alleges the search of the motel room where he was staying violated their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and bathroom ceiling tiles did not exceed the scope of pargo’s consent. knew the purpose of the search was to find illegal narcotics. id. the court found filed march 28, 2012 directs our attention to the following statements within attachment b: a. polk county case no. fecr234743 defendant were discussing the identity of a green, leafy substance on the dash room to perform a “knock and talk.” that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy.” we opt to do the initial statements were credible has no bearing on the fact the informant and drugs. he asked to speak with detective nicolino, who had not heard from chantez thornton. officers found paraphernalia and crack cocaine packaged in 2 look around,” and pargo again agreed. pargo’s consent was unequivocal. any jury instruction no. 13 provided the jury with the theory of aiding and only upon a finding of probable cause. state v. skola, 634 n.w.2d 687, 689 stipulations and evidence presented during the suppression hearing. state v. sustain his convictions. an aider and abettor may be found to be guilty just as a containers placed on the curb at 1549 des moines street for weekly pickup. residence. upon further questioning, he admitted selling the drugs used at his context of the entire conversation with the officers, pargo’s statement would lead time before the completion of the search. see state v. myer, 441 n.w.2d 762, point they searched the ceiling tiles and found a bag of marijuana.6 motel room where he was staying. these searches yielded evidence used to the warrant application contained credible independent evidence corroborating used as a filter on the pipe—and a small plastic bag in his pocket. officers evidence of a crime in the identified place. davis, 679 n.w.2d at (observing the located a wallet, handgun, and a large quantity of crack cocaine. officer crowdis look above the ceiling tiles, the search was unreasonably broad. he alleges his pargo failed to return the detective’s calls or meet with him at arranged times defendant-appellant. ii. scope and standards of review count in the case. generate probable cause because the officers obtained valid consent to search 3 released pargo, instructing him they would need to remain in contact. because here for two or three days. this is all of my stuff. you are more than welcome to of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; failure to possess a affirmed. large rock of crack in his sock.1 where one might hide drugs. warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable and therefore the officer and the suspect.” mcconnelee, 690 n.w.2d at 31 (quoting florida v. argument, his attorney conceded pargo had the requisite authority to consent to pargo was selling illicit substances. most notably, detective nicolino’s for crack cocaine and a weapon, his consent included searching areas where coming up from the basement. golston had a crack pipe, a brillo pad—often 15 id. the officers found two marijuana cigarettes floating in the toilet, at which the three officers entered the room, and officer gilmore again asked if house. the room. once inside the room, officer gilmore repeated his request to “take a of pargo’s withdrawal of his initial consent, the officers conducted a proper parked in front of the residence. the informant’s description of the suspect’s the same. cf. state v. stanford, 474 n.w.2d 573, 575 (iowa 1991) (provision of 2010). first we determine whether the individual challenging the search has a pargo’s house. as discussed above, detective nicolino—who has been an unreliable informant and false information, no probable cause existed to issue the intent to deliver and one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, whom the detective confirmed were active in the drug trade. the detective both counts. see iowa code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(3), 124.411, 902.8 (2009). on defendant is entitled to a franks hearing upon making a substantial preliminary presents no further cues, verbal or non-verbal, to suggest pargo limited the on the basis of his observations, detective nicolino arranged with the the offense.”). the policy supporting this rule is to ensure a conviction is not and denied both motions to suppress. in case fecr234742—tried from june we derive the scope of an individual’s consent by considering what a room. when the officer returned with thornton’s belongings, thornton unbundled the evidence that pargo “assented to or lent countenance and approval to the officer delaney handcuffed pargo and read him his miranda rights; pargo 17 sergeant edwards made contact with the vehicle and identified pargo as the witnessed by detective nicolino. because these circumstances could compel a been any suspicious activity coming from the room, and proceeded toward the of crack cocaine. pargo also acknowledged allowing others to use drugs at his bathroom ceiling tiles exceeded pargo’s consent. 5 acknowledgement of the guilt of the offense charged,” and therefore are owed one could hide such contraband, including the space above a drop-panel ceiling. voluntary. state v. folkens, 281 n.w.2d 1, 3 (iowa 1979). drugs, he consented to a search of any area in the motel room officers, as well as the confidential informant “has been corroborated by law when the defendant said the officer could “check it.” id. at 31. the officer “did officers followed the cadillac, confirming the driver’s description as that of pargo. wrongfully deprived of a franks hearing to prove this. he concludes without the basis existed for the district court to find probable cause to issue the search he confessed to possessing 22 counsel was ineffective for failing to raise or preserve this argument for appeal. investigations—observed suspicious behavior at pargo’s residence consistent omitted). corroboration can be through direct or circumstantial evidence. not met either prerequisite, the district court properly denied his request for a instead had an arrangement consistent with other crack houses he has come offender under section 124.411 and a habitual offender under section 902.8. pargo’s claim fails on the breach-of-duty prong. see state v. scalise, 660 establishing the crime charged. “other proof” must support the conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that the defendant committed evidence pargo aided and abetted the possession and distribution of narcotics. entering the side door, i would observe the individuals exiting the side no. 2-050 / 10-1492 (iowa 2001). to prove aiding and abetting, the state must present substantial willing to provide details of other drug activity to detective nicolino in exchange s. ct. 2041, 2048, 36 l. ed. 2d 854, 863 (1973) (“in situations where the police officers entered and repeated their request to search the room. the record pargo also admitted using illegal drugs, listing his daily intake of each not bound by them. mcconnelee, 690 n.w.2d at 30. itself does not have to prove the offense beyond a reasonable 14 depends upon a two-step analysis. state v. fleming, 790 n.w.2d 590, 564 (iowa probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances, emergency aid, and officer for ten years, five of which he has spent specializing in narcotics evidence from both searches. contrary to pargo’s claim on appeal, the officers detective nicolino applied for the search warrant in question. in in its suppression ruling, the district court “[a]ssum[ed] without conceding (iowa 2005). the fourth amendment imposes a standard of reasonableness franks hearing. the ceiling to be within the scope of pena’s consent, reasoning: urine sample). but to do so, he or she “must clearly inform the appropriate 8 pargo’s confessions to detective nicolino following the search of his other non-verbal conduct displayed. id. at 30. at any time before the search is house laid the groundwork for the evidence presented at trial. pargo admitted girlfriend, leareaner austin, in the bedroom. they found cocaine and a crack consider only the information, reduced to writing, presented to the court at the [ x ] the informant’s past information has led to the making of 0 crimes based on the items found in the motel room. the state charged him with supreme court explains: failure to do so, coupled with the context of the conversation, resulted in the searching above the ceiling tiles in the bathroom. with drug sales, and recovered discarded paraphernalia in pargo’s trash withdrawal” fails to revoke consent). invalid unless the search falls within one of the recognized exceptions. see abetting. additionally, the jury heard closing arguments from the state alleging firearm as a convicted felon. the jury found by special interrogatory that pargo this isn’t my room. i’ve been here for two or three days. this is all pargo’s cadillac was parked in front of the house during detective nicolino’s reject pargo’s pro se claim that the warrant lacked probable cause because the time of the applicant’s request for the warrant. id. at 656. on review, “we draw have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining to search the motel room. pargo responded: “this isn’t my room. i’ve been merely fortifies the truth of the confession, without independently contains ample evidence—apart from that supplied by the informant—that favorable to the state. id. because questions as to witness credibility are within judge. a. officers had probable cause to conduct a warranted search id. they could have “a look in the room,” to which pena responded “yeah, go ahead.” 12 nicolino surveilled the residence and noted a high volume of short-term vehicle exceeded his consent to search. 690 n.w.2d at 32. in that case, the officer and use, finding it to be “a pretty high number”—stating he has never come across anyone his house and to receiving a portion of the cocaine sold. he also admitted selling 7 occupants. they found two individuals, larry golston and william deeds, confidential informant had not previously supplied information to assist police. probable cause. state v. davis, 679 n.w.2d 651, 655–56 (iowa 2004). in des moines police officers executed a search warrant for a residence pargo denied having with him. at the same time, officer delaney tried to identify of individuals against arbitrary invasion.” lovig, 675 n.w.2d at 562 (quotations company’s work at the address, which had shut down the power lines to the hearing to show as much. when attacking the statements within an affidavit, a evidence to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with weeks prior to the arrest. the small bags of crack cocaine found on thornton possession or control of a firearm, as a subsequent offender; failure to possess a although discovering the contraband could trigger other exceptions to the warrantless for 0 search warrant, as to confidential informant. pargo also offers a bare assertion that the affidavit contains false does not suggest any revocation occurred before officer crowdis discovered the his tax stamp and firearm violations, with both fines suspended. the court warrant for pargo’s residence. he argues the confidential informant was given its factual symmetry, the pena rationale is more persuasive on the pargo refutes the state’s outside authority with the mcconnelee case, thomas j. miller, attorney general, bridget a. chambers, assistant the searches. the district court held a combined hearing on june 10–11, 2010, pargo challenges the searches under the fourth amendment to the years imprisonment and a $1000 fine for his conviction in fecr234743. with in another pro se claim, pargo contends the state offered insufficient the bathroom, while officer gilmore asked pargo for his wallet or i.d., which permission to search. intent to deliver. whether the evidence presented is sufficient to support a driver’s license. the officers checked the name for warrants, asked if there had encouraging the possession and distribution of narcotics. combined with knowingly by the affiant or with reckless disregard for the truth,and he was in attachment “a,” detective nicolino described the characteristics of visitors of pargo’s they had received complaints about the room and that they could smell pargo correctly asserts his convictions cannot stand solely on the basis of side door on the east side of 1549 des moines street. a short time after moines police department supported the confidential informant’s statement that interest or properly conducted the search under a recognized exception. id. information to the department. if they had nowhere else to go. pargo paid the bills for the house. 19 possession of cocaine base with intent to deliver while in the immediate drug tax stamp; and felon in possession of a firearm, designating him as a convictions for a drug tax stamp violation and possession of a firearm as a felon. not directly ask the defendant for permission to search the entire car.” id. the informant regarding an individual known as “sosa,” who was selling crack walters, mathis, and donahue each testified the house bore attributes consistent case, the investigation by detective nicolino and other members of the des while warrantless searches are considered unreasonably invasive, 9 b. sufficient evidence exists to support pargo’s conviction in when reviewing whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, we are c. proceedings vs. substance. he estimated he smoked a quarter ounce of marijuana, an eight ball (10th cir. 1998), where law enforcement received a tip that two individuals were “eight balls”4 pad, and a plastic baggie in his pocket. austin, pargo’s live-in girlfriend, was and a weapon in room 209, officer gilmore asked pargo “for consent to search the woman also present in room 209. both occupants gave false identities, as verdict turns upon whether the evidence is substantial. hagedorn, 679 n.w.2d at pargo’s protected interest. 155–56, 98 s. ct. 2674, 2676, 57 l. ed. 2d 667, 672 (1978). because pargo has showing that (1) the affiant included a knowingly and intentionally false ___ (iowa 2012). the validity of an individual’s consent to search depends on to be pargo bolsters the credibility of the other information presented by the 462 u.s. 213, 238, 103 s. ct. 2317, 2332 76 l. ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983). in this same confidential informant to purchase crack cocaine from “sosa.” the of law. state v. hagedorn, 679 n.w.2d 666, 668 (iowa 2004). we will uphold a 4 affidavit before the court, a fair probability exists that law enforcement will find 139 (iowa 2011). admissions may constitute a confession if they “amount to an consent is among the permissible exceptions. state v. lowe, ___ n.w.2d ___, substances. officer steinkamp noted the house was not furnished for everyday suggested the weapon or narcotics would be found above the ceiling tiles, the heard by vaitheswaran, p.j., and tabor and mullins, jj. state v. polly, 657 n.w.2d 462, 466 (iowa 2003) (citations and quotations convict him in two separate drug prosecutions. attempting to evade police by climbing out a second story window. that door before leaving the area in their vehicle. i recognized the short term ambiguity created by pargo’s initial reference to his “stuff” was resolved once the driver. a criminal history check revealed pargo had several arrests for controlled official that the initial consent has been limited, withdrawn or revoked.” id. seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” u.s. const. amend. iv. the fourteenth living—lacking amenities such as furniture, clothing, food, and hangers—and legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. id. if such an expectation of crack, and ingested two ecstasy tablets per day.2 county attorney, for appellee. all reasonable inferences to support a court’s finding of probable cause.” id. the state also addresses pargo’s pro se argument, asserting trial counsel had search.” pargo then stepped back and held the door open for the officers. pargo does not contest whether his consent was voluntary, and at oral reached the house, pargo opened the side door, leaning out to see who was interpreted as consenting only to a search of his luggage. but when placed in did not exceed the scope of his consent when looking for crack cocaine and a who used as much as pargo claimed in a day. of my stuff. you are more than welcome to search. search was improper. he argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue john audlehelm of audlehelm law office, des moines, for appellant. (iowa 2004). this review requires assessing the entire record, including with the crime. the state must offer evidence to show the crime in the court of appeals of iowa sufficient if it is supported by the totality of the circumstances. illinois v. gates, march 31, 2010, the state filed a second trial information charging pargo with freeman, 705 n.w.2d at 297 (including searches based on plain view, consent, 4 initially held that a bathroom is included within consent to search a hotel room sense determination whether, given the totality of the circumstances within the 13 and in connection with the contraband found in the motel room. pargo told of crack cocaine, a rifle, and a handgun, all of which were hidden in failed to specify which statements are false. after listing several facts relayed by and crack cocaine before the officers’ arrival. pargo said he had no more drugs important and reliable evidence.”). the crime stoppers tip did not have to standard for determining what a reasonable person would believe consent ascertaining whether a substantial basis exists to find probable cause, we may relating to government officials’ discretion “to safeguard the privacy and security even when the evidence provided through the confidential informant is bags with trace amounts of marijuana and several parts of plastic baggies. one his house on the east side of des moines, as well as the consent search of a for drug transactions, bringing buyers and sellers together in his house. in the house, but was expecting an additional delivery. an “eight ball” is a measurement of crack weighing approximately 3.5 grams. statement, or one made with reckless disregard for its truth, and (2) without the above the ceiling tiles in the bathroom. the state identifies a similar factual consent on february 28, 2010, des moines police officers gilmore, crowdis, and search of room 209. see united states v. alfaro, 935 f.2d 64, 67 (5th cir. 1991) was in the immediate possession or control of a firearm, for purposes of the first william a. pargo, fort dodge, pro se. of the baggies tested positive for marijuana, and one for cocaine. search: specifically, that the officers were looking for drugs in the motel room. retrieval. along with mail addressed to pargo, detective nicolino recovered three question of probable cause depends on “a nexus between criminal activity, the we review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges for correction of errors residence. for his release. but officers ultimately arrested him on his outstanding warrants reasonably include areas in which one would be expected to hide 5 to a report of narcotics and a firearm in the room and asked for pargo’s consent residing at the address with austin since mid-december and thornton had been on the first floor, officers secured pargo’s satisfied that no words or conduct curtailed the officer’s search, we next this at trial and on appeal. consent to an officer’s request to search for drugs would pargo argues pro se that because no evidence in the motel room statement, probable cause would not exist. franks v. delaware, 438 u.s. 154, the informant to lend to the informant’s credibility, the state argues the affidavit we recognize pargo had the right to withdraw or limit his consent at any warrant. detective nicolino recovered and sorted the contents of two trash decide whether the court had a substantial basis for determining the existence of present facts. notably, pargo did not admit using or possessing drugs in the reasonable person to believe further evidence of a crime could be found at the and foot traffic, consistent with the sale of controlled substances.5 state of iowa, delaney were dispatched to a motel located at 5626 douglas avenue in des middle-man in drug transactions, using his house to facilitate deals between i. background facts and proceedings based upon coerced or untrue confessions. state v. meyers, 799 n.w.2d 132, charging him as a second or subsequent offender and as a habitual offender on defendant’s consent. id. dealing. intent to deliver while in immediate possession of a firearm, as well as his gilmore described the sounds as “somebody [who] had gone to the bathroom, if his consent extended to the entire room, the officer’s search above the respect to his three-count conviction in the second case, the court sentenced william pargo challenges the constitutionality of the warranted search of 28–30—the jury convicted pargo of possession of crack cocaine with intent to the officers entered the house, dispersing to all rooms to locate any officers also found chantez thornton on the second floor. thornton had finding of guilt if it is supported by substantial evidence. id. amendment of the united states constitution extends this right to protect of any area where the item may be hidden. therefore, the search above the 16 3 individual was secured by an officer on the second floor of the house. they “could take a look around.” when pargo said “yes,” officer crowdis entered “typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between affirmed. outside the house noticed someone—later identified as a relative of pargo— additional officer testimony relating to the search, the record contains substantial in addition, larry golston, one of the two residents found ascending the pargo to thirty years imprisonment and a $1000 fine for possession with intent to 10 encompassed, the circuit court noted that because the officer asked for consent evidence found was admissible. pargo contends his consent authorized the deliver, and an indeterminate fifteen-year term of incarceration and $750 fine for pargo acted both as a principal and an aider and abettor, specifically relating to officers “you are welcome to search,” once the officers were inside the room, (holding any conduct falling “short of an unequivocal act or statement of on march 24, 2010, in connection with the warrant executed on his house, ten separate baggies on thornton, who had been living in the house for two several small rocks of crack cocaine and paraphernalia in his jeans pocket and a attachment b also asserts the information provided by the participating after the search, detective nicolino requested a warrant for his arrest. for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia in arkansas. id. the court searches incident to arrest as recognized exceptions). whether a government no duty to raise a futile argument. informant, and is the basis for pargo’s claim of unreliability. specifically, pargo [ x ] the informant has supplied information in the past on 0 court’s finding that the full search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the witness credibility, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact, though we are lovig, 675 n.w.2d 557, 562 (iowa 2004). because of its opportunity to assess observation of the controlled buy from an individual other officers later confirmed when pargo opened the door, officer gilmore advised him they were responding located at 1549 des moines street on january 22, 2010. when the search team absent probable cause. schneckloth v. bustamonte, 412 u.s. 218, 227, 93 (1991)). this determination is based on the totality of the circumstances and drugs at the residence earlier that morning, but had smoked all of the marijuana nicolino after the motel arrest, he recounted the hidden drugs stashed in the mcconnellee is distinguishable because pargo’s conversation with the omitted). accordingly, if a search does not fall into one of the enumerated exceptions, a search and seizure is not reasonable without a valid warrant. pargo spoke with detective chad nicolino at the scene and agreed to give experience, as being consistent with street level drug dealing from a 18 successfully purchased narcotics from pargo—an event orchestrated and i observed a high volume of short term vehicle and foot traffic to 1549 1 stripped from the affidavit, probable cause still exists to grant a search warrant of the province of the jury, it is not the role of the court to resolve conflicts in the informant’s initial statements were excised from the application. vehicle and foot traffic to 1549 des moines street from my training and deliver. in case fecr235500—tried from july 12–13—the jury found him guilty pargo since the raid on pargo’s house. at the station, pargo again was very 668. “‘substantial evidence’ is that upon which a rational trier of fact could find daily usage of crack cocaine, among other drugs, and that he had smoked earlier in each case, pargo filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through ordered the sentences from the three counts to run concurrently, but consecutive 2 detective nicolino was suspicious as to the accuracy of pargo’s recollection of drug completed, the person who initially gave consent may limit, withdraw, or revoke pargo initially denied selling drugs, but subsequently called himself a 124.401(1)(e), 453b.3, 453b.12, 724.26, 902.8. cocaine from 1549 des moines street. “sosa” drove a white cadillac, usually the rafters of his basement. after advising pargo they were investigating a tip that there were narcotics the state discounts pargo’s allegation of false statements, noting he has enforcement personnel,” and the informant has not previously provided false these uncorroborated extrajudicial confessions. see iowa r. crim. p. 2.21(4) the motel room with the officers as they conducted their search. but the record 6 enforcement’s intent to discover contraband is reasonably consenting to a search occasions that has proven reliable, as to confidential informant. detective saw the informant meet with an individual the informant knew as ________________________________________________________________ brokering sales between a tenant and other individuals is consistent with appeal from the iowa district court for polk county, scott d. rosenberg, exists, we then consider if the government unreasonably invaded that protected of the house. i then observed occupants from the vehicle approach the approaching. execution of the warrant was complicated by an electric of the totality of the circumstances.” state v. mcconnelee, 690 n.w.2d 27, 30 precluded from making an independent finding of probable cause; rather we the search. but he argues the police exceeded the scope of consent by evidence. state v. williams, 695 n.w.2d 23, 28 (iowa 2005). search, the pena court continued its analysis through the scope-of-consent lens. tax stamp; and possession, receipt, transportation, or dominion of control over a des moines street. . . . i observed vehicles parking in the street in front police detailed information in exchange for his arrest. pargo said he had been (iowa ct. app. 2001). a judge is charged with making a practical, common- attorney general, john sarcone, county attorney, and steven bayens, assistant pargo also stepped back and held the door open for the officers to enter freeman, 705 n.w.2d at 297. the room.” pargo replied: in his pro se supplemental brief, pargo challenges whether a substantial firearm above a ceiling tile in the motel bathroom. as for the search warrant, we criminal act . . . either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it.” n.w.2d 58, 61–62 (iowa 2003). b. polk county case no. fecr235500 on august 31, 2010, pargo stipulated to being a second or subsequent because pargo knowingly and voluntarily consented to a search of the room, all principal under iowa code section 703.1. state v. allen, 633 n.w.2d 752, 754 pargo also argues pro se that because no evidence directed the officers to because it is part of the room’s accommodations. id. at 1368. in reiterating the the state contends because pargo knew the officers would be searching residence: moines in response to a polk county crime stoppers tip that individuals in room habitual offender on all three counts. see iowa code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(3), where our supreme court found an officer’s search of the defendant’s vehicle 11 outside, he asked an officer to retrieve his shoes and socks from a dresser drawer in his speaking with the occupants, officer crowdis advised the other two officers he found lying in a bed on the first floor with cocaine and a crack pipe. officers this constitutional safeguard permits a judge to issue a search warrant confidential informant. state v. sykes, 412 n.w.2d 578, 583 (iowa 1987). residence, as well as facilitating other sales to “support his habit.” pargo argues his statements, as reported by the officers, could be marijuana. id. after pena admitted to smoking marijuana, one officer asked if crack cocaine. the car was registered in pargo’s name. over the next few days, tile panel of the bathroom’s drop-ceiling. plaintiff-appellee, drug trafficking community. pargo listed the names of twelve dealers, many of


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