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Lenderman v St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Board of Police Commissioners

Case No. 12-3193 (C.A. 8, Aug. 5, 2013)

S.L. brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against several St. Louis police officers for arresting her on false charges and conspiring to hide it. She also brought municipal liability claims for deliberate indifference and inadequate supervision. The district court denied qualified immunity to the officers responsible for the false arrest and to Lieutenant Colonel Reggie Harris and Sergeant Lathan Isshawn-O'Quinn for involvement in covering up the arrest. It also denied summary judgment to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Board of Police Commissioners ("Board") on S.L.'s municipal liability claims. Isshawn-O'Quinn, Harris, and the municipal defendants appeal. We affirm the denial of qualified immunity to the two officers and dismiss the Board's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I.



Officer Susie Lorthridge and Lieutenant Henrietta Arnold were St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) officers assigned to the eighth district. During the July 3, 2010 workday Officer Lorthridge drove Lieutenant Arnold home to pick up some medication. There, Arnold was surprised to discover her son's girlfriend, S.L., in his bedroom. She ordered S.L. out of the house and warned her, "[I]f somebody doesn't come and get you in five minutes, then I'm going to call your parents. And if they don't answer, then I'm going to take you to jail."

When S.L. was unable to find a ride home, Officer Lorthridge suggested to Lieutenant Arnold that they arrest her. Arnold initially expressed some concern, but Lorthridge assured her that an arrest would be lawful because S.L. had been trespassing. Lorthridge then handcuffed S.L., and the two officers took her to the police station. S.L. testified that during the ride to the station, Arnold called her a "white bitch" and stated she would like to "slit [S.L.'s] throat." S.L. also heard Arnold make a call on her cell phone, reporting that she and Lorthridge had "a problem, but when we get there, we'll talk to you about it." It seemed to S.L. that Arnold was talking to a superior officer. Since Lieutenant Arnold was the highest ranking officer in her own district at that time, S.L. later concluded that the call must have been made to Lieutenant Colonel Reggie Harris, the head of SLMPD's internal affairs unit.
 

 

Judge(s): Diana Murphy
Jurisdiction: U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Related Categories: Constitutional Law , Employment , Government / Politics
 
Circuit Court Judge(s)
Raymond Gruender
Diana Murphy
Lavenski Smith

 
Trial Court Judge(s)
Carol Jackson

 

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record that the board had been deliberately indifferent to widespread false arrests by 14 (citations omitted). and drawing all reasonable inferences in [her] favor." nance, 586 f.3d at 609. on conduct that violated [s.l.'s] civil rights." arnold was talking to a superior officer. since lieutenant arnold was the highest lorthridge had violated her fourth amendment rights by making a false arrest and parents. and if they don't answer, then i'm going to take you to jail." in the particular circumstances of this case, harris and isshawn-o'quinn also isshawn-o'quinn and harris, we consider first whether its findings and the factual one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the arnold's] son, and she arrested me for trespassing." according to s.l. the officer never interpreted harbury to require this type of categorization, however, and the qualified immunity, veneklase v. city of fargo, 78 f.3d 1264, 1270 (8th cir. 1996), scheduled court hearing. no information was given to s.l. about the right to counsel assault were about $10,000 and that she did not have health insurance. affairs division rather than immediately suspend[ing]" the arresting officers, which drafts. the evidence similarly supports an inference that harris leaked information -12- harbury that s.l. “has no alternative cause of action against harris and isshawn- summary judgment in favor of the defendants, determining that the plaintiffs failed approved the falsified arrest documents related to s.l.'s arrest, including a summons arnold for the first time as an officer assisting in the arrest. isshawn-o'quinn complaint, white house and state department officials intentionally misled her lorthridge and isshawn-o'quinn conspired to conceal arnold'sroleinthearrest[]and because it would require examination of slmpd supervision and training policies violation cognizable under section 1983.”). because s.l.’s complaint does not the individual officers moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity delaneywas being interviewed. alleged conspiracymembersarnold and lorthridge established constitutional right, s.l. would indeed be entitled to bring a claim under bring a separate action against other actors involved in a prior constitutional actively pursuing simultaneous tort claims for her injuries in that case, id. at 422, s.l. location of an arrest to place it within the city of st. louis, and in making false harris "conspired to deprive her of her constitutional rights." badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights," had compromised, going no further than the protean allegation that the state has reason to "understand his conduct was unlawful" and in violation of the arrestee's of police isom, this issue "requires entirely different analys[i]s" from the question of approving a falsified incident report. s.l. also alleged that the four police officers providing an imaginary witness to s.l.'s arrest by searching for a name in the jonathan threw s.l. to the floor and choked her. s.l. attempted to flee through the continued to choke and hit s.l., threw her against a washer/dryer, and left the house. isshawn-o'quinn, both of which he rejected. in the fourth draft lorthridge named the arrest. lorthridge then produced two more draft reports for consideration by -10- to establish liability for failure to supervise, s.l. must show "deliberate indifference and stated that she "really d[id]n't believe that [she] did anything wrong." she asked 536 u.s. at 415) (third and fourth alterations in original)). i therefore conclude that lorthridge, and others to recover for her injuries. the fact that s.l. may bring a similarly warned him that "if [s.l.] doesn't change that story, my mom is going to i. immunitytothemons.l.'s conspiracyclaim. stateofficials enjoyqualified immunity steidl v. fermon, 494 f.3d 623, 633 (7th cir. 2007); broudy v. mather, 460 f.3d 106, amendments to the united states constitution”) with compl. ¶ 49 (alleging that constitutional right to bring a § 1983 action for her false arrest and detention by we conclude that the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to s.l., isshawn-o'quinnwouldnot determinewhether theboard wasdeliberatelyindifferent on s.l.'s municipal liability claims for lack of jurisdiction. by riverway development which no longer operated at the site of the imaginary gerdine, treasurer; francis g. slay, ex-officio member; daniel w. isom, chief to establish an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. the arrest[]," and we accept that determination at this stage. see lockridge, 315 f.3d which “[t]he official acts claimed to have denied access may allegedly have caused affairs] investigation." it then observed that a § 1983 conspiracy claim "can proceed advocated for her promotion, and that she considered hima mentor. arnold indicated isshawn-o'quinn and harris, "viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [s.l.] § 1983, irrespective of her claims against arnold and lorthridge. but the record does the honorable carol e. jackson, united states district judge for the eastern1 richard delaney after he was interviewed by the internal affairs division. harris district of missouri. inextricably intertwined with the question of qualified immunity. arnold and 28 f.3d 802, 812–13 (8th cir. 1994). not wearing shoes and her hair was scattered about her head." according to this draft hearing in march 2011, the board found that he had failed to supervise lorthridge an official’s past action denied her access to the courts, her complaint “should state claimed that the defendant police officers’ failure to investigate properly the death of the evidence is sufficient to permit a particular finding of fact after trial." johnson, o'quinn reviewed it and gave it his approval. -13- denial of access when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a violateaplaintiff's clearlyestablished constitutionalrights. mettler v. whitledge,165 refused, jonathan choked and beat her to the point of causing a punctured lung, air employee to succeed on her deliberate indifference claim because the board may be available under the access claim and presently unique to it. intertwined" with the qualified immunity appeal and we thus lack jurisdiction to and holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a constitutional violation because his has been deterred from seeking employment based on the false arrest report. access to the courts.” id. at 408-10. she was pregnant with jonathan's child, and she protested, "you're hurting me . . . . dismiss the board's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. -5- rather than the actions of individual officers, see tilson v. forrest city police dep't, interview. viewing the record in the light most favorable to s.l. as we must, a including his deposition testimony that he had recommended that arnold "be intelligence agency (“cia”). id. at 406. eventually, harbury’s husband was or alerting any superior officer about the creative reporting. isshawn-o'quinn's years before. appeal from united states district court officials as defendants); id. at 419 n.17, 421 n.20 (noting that the intentional- ultimately disciplined both lieutenant arnold and sergeant isshawn-o'quinn. submitted: march 12, 2013 police. s.l. testified that jonathan told her "that his mom was going to lose her job statements during the internal affairs investigation. arnold was found to have failure to properly investigate a crime could result in the denial of a person’s lockridge,315 f.3d at1008. s.l.alleges that harris and isshawn-o'quinn conspired the complaint must identify a “remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not them. action, harburyalleged that various federal officials “unconstitutionallyimpeded her colonel harris and sergeant isshawn-o'quinn, and we dismiss the appeal by the murphy, circuit judge. supports a conclusion that harris and isshawn-o'quinn conspired with arnold and summons," thereby violating the department's requirement that he "review all in scheeler v. city of st. cloud, minn., we said that the “right of access to the documentation . . . to make sure they appeared legitimate and appropriate." this time. the arrest report also named an intersection within the st. louis city limits as computer system for a name and to "be creative." arnold and lorthridge. "[t]he right of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an plaintiff's clearly established federal rights." id. (quoting harrison v. springdale water & sewer comm'n, 780 f.2d 1422, 1427–28 that the police report charged s.l. with trespass for being on a public intersection. . . . . i don't feel that i should have to lie for [arnold], because she was in the wrong of his relationship with arnold, or any role he may have had in covering up the arrest. the underlying claim in accordance with federal rule of civil procedure 8(a), just as to complete our analysis of the first element, we consider whether the record harris and isshawn-o'quinn because she may bring claims against arnold, lllllllllllllllllllll defendant - appellants incident summary. he then approved the modified report without question or a lawyer." the lawyer retained by s.l. ultimately recommended filing this § 1983 were "sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment." lockridge v. bd. of s.l.'s proffered evidence linking them to any conspiracy, but that is collateral to misconduct. ware v. jackson cnty., mo., 150 f.3d 873, 880 (8th cir. 1998). on s.l.'s inadequate supervision claim, concluding that "[t]here is no evidence that internal affairs investigation was shared with arnold by harris. nance, 586 f.3d at s.l.'s municipal liability claims. isshawn-o'quinn, harris, and the municipal involvement in the alleged conspiracy. he encouraged lorthridge to "be creative" in the issues raised by the municipal defendants are thus not inextricably intertwined supervise arnold, lorthridge, and isshawn-o'quinn. lockridge, 315 f.3d at 1012. s.l. was there, s.l. told her, "i was just seeing my boyfriend, . . . [lieutenant riverwaydevelopmenthadactuallyowned avacant lot adjacent to arnold's property, -9- "necessarily resolves the pendent claims as well." lockridge, 315 f.3d at 1012 the district court's denial of summary judgment on s.l.'s municipal liability gruender, circuit judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. board had been deliberatelyindifferent to false reporting or that anyofthedefendants in which officers unwittingly accepted a falsified arrest report or disclosed details of officers harris and isshawn-o’quinn are entitled to qualified immunity and would department and [national security council] defendants’ ‘false and deceptive infliction-of-emotional-distress counts underlying the denial-of-access claim named interpose the federal courts between the states and the people . . . [and] to protect the tort or criminal assault laws committed by a state official results in a constitutional officer would be aware that it is impermissible to assist in falsifying an arrest report replied, "are you serious?" and shook her head. another officer later removed s.l. arnold, lorthridge, isshawn-o'quinn, and harris had violated her fourteenth in some suit that may yet be brought,” harbury, 536 u.s. at 415, her allegations do harris and isshawn-o'quinn conspired with arnold and lorthridge to prevent s.l. suits at the present time.” id. at 413. in these cases, “[t]he opportunity has not been lost for all time . . . the object of the denial-of-access suit, and the justification for for the eighth circuit judgment on s.l.'s claim that it was deliberately indifferent to a pattern of b. -4- charge. we generally lack jurisdiction "to hear an immediate appeal from a district up the unlawful arrest.” the complaint further alleges that the conspiracy “deprived -22- that colonel harris, the head of slmpd's internal affairs division, informed arnold these cases do not look forward to a class of future litigation, but judgment against the officers. id. at 15 (quoting mitchum, 407 u.s. 225, 242 (1972)). court's order denying summary judgment, because such an order is not a final finally, s.l. testified that the arrest and cover up caused her to be "deathly -7- lllllllllllllllllllll defendants did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a would be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find that harris and the district court denied qualified immunity to isshawn-o'quinn and harris rule 8(a) and harbury. moreover, it is of no moment under the reasoning of united states that could have saved her husband’s life. id. at 409-10. in a bivens oversaw that division and had access to confidential information about delaney's in order to assist her in concealing facts sought by investigators. unconstitutional action under color of state law," mitchum v. foster, 407 u.s. 225, related to the trespassing charge. there is also no evidence at this point about for a city court hearing. s.l.'s father testified in his deposition that after viewing the comment. drawing "reasonable inferences in [s.l.'s] favor," nance, 586 f.3d at 609, officer susie lorthridge and lieutenant henrietta arnold were st. louis unconstitutional conduct which could not be individually attributed to any one you're not supposed to put your hands on me. i'm about to have a baby." jonathan to pick up some medication. there, arnold was surprised to discover her son's links s.l.'s physical and economic injuries to arnold's overt acts, see westborough -23- from the cell and took her to a second police station. there, s.l. was placed in a cell against officers harris and isshawn-o’quinn merely due to “[t]he fact that s.l. may while there is no direct evidence that arnold instructed her son jonathan to "with about six or seven other girls" for "about four or five hours" before an officer however, does not provide adequate redress for her injuries arising from the of action. id at 421. supervise claim against him. harris is entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct "entitled to 'free and unhampered access to the courts'" to pursue § 1983 actions. id. isshawn-o'quinn, harris, isom, and the board then filed this interlocutory rights. without probable cause, in the creation of a false incident report, in altering the that the board received no information about the frequency of false arrests in st. the internal affairs investigation continued, and the summary hearing board isshawn-o'quinn and harris challenge the district court's denial of qualified a city court hearing related to the false arrest. the court additionally concludes that amount to a violation of a clearly established right. by unlawfully seizing her person, detaining her, and creating a false report to cover that lorthridge "be creative" in finding one there. delaney's name was in the mall, inc. v. city of cape girardeau, 693 f.2d 733, 743 (8th cir. 1982), which are in summary judgment was denied on all other claims. as relevant to this appeal, for the eastern district of missouri - st. louis officer isshawn-o’quinn’s alleged conduct, leads to her inability to identify the does not support a denial-of-access claim, i respectfully dissent as to parts iii and v courts is well-established” in this circuit and concluded that a police department’s v. requirement that a backward-looking denial-of-access claim provide a remedy that promoted totherank of lieutenant,"and arnold's testimonythatsheconsidered harris the same scenario the supreme court confronted when it rejected the plaintiff’s brought discredit on the department, and her employment was terminated. -2- whether the trespassing charge was ever expunged from s.l.'s record or whether she -8- united states court of appeals metropolitan police department (slmpd) officers assigned to the eighth district. a § 1983 action against them for unlawfully covering up a constitutional violation. problem, but when we get there, we'll talk to you about it." it seemed to s.l. that -3- to isshawn-o'quinn, the district court determined that a reasonable jury could find sought from them is obtainable elsewhere. as discussed above, s.l. identifies no5 s.l. also brought municipal liability claims against the board and certain s.l. filed this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 alleging that her arrest by with respect to harris, the district court similarly determined that the record accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity to to their right of access to the courts.” id. at 831. arnold make a call on her cell phone, reporting that she and lorthridge had "a found in the police department's computer system after isshawn-o'quinn suggested claim of injury by an overt act of the conspiracy. isshawn-o'quinn reviewed and -15- 1283, 1285 (8th cir. 1987) (“while we deplore the action complained of if the through her claims against arnold or through a primary tort suit against jonathan. or how she might contact a lawyer. unlawful search and seizure and may be recovered through s.l.’s § 1983 claim girlfriend of arnold's son. the board also concluded that isshawn-o'quinn had were not entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 conspiracy charge because their son caused a loss of evidence that precluded them from pursuing “a wrongful simplification,’ rather than ‘the only possible categorization.’” ante at 12 n.4 and to lieutenant colonel reggie harris and sergeant lathan isshawn-o'quinn for not support a denial-of-access claim. it follows that s.l.’s complaint fails to establish against arnold and lorthridge. and while jonathan’s alleged assault of s.l. is amounted to inadequate supervision. at the police station s.l. was given a "city court summons" ordering her to remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” harbury, 536 nlrb, 467 u.s. 883, 896–97 (1984), which our court has recognized as a protect our most valued rights," bounds v. smith, 430 u.s. 817, 828 (1977) (citations her § 1983 action because that statute was enacted "to protect the people from deficiencies. he pointed out that among other things the report had been submitted f.3d 1197, 1206 (8th cir. 1999). we conclude that conspiring to prevent a plaintiff does not affect harbury’s central holding. in any case where a plaintiff alleges that cia officials as defendants). categorization." id. at 414 n.11. moreover, while the plaintiff in harbury was in sum, harbury requires a backward-looking denial-of-access claim to state determine that an officer overseeing such a unit, which was part of the slmpd's lorthridge and arnold, and the cover up of that arrest by harris and conspiracy “deprived [her] of her rights under the fourth and fourteenth wever v. lincoln cnty., neb., 388 f.3d 601, 606 (8th cir. 2004) (citation omitted). of trs. of univ. of ark., 315 f.3d 1005, 1008 (8th cir. 2003) (en banc) (citation that a plaintiff must make to pursue a constitutional denial-of-access claim. see had both searched in the slmpd computer system for references to richard delaney harris and isshawn-o'quinn also challenge the sufficiency and admissibility3 said to have previously asked s.l. "repeatedly . . . not to trespass on [its] property." trespassing. lorthridge then handcuffed s.l., and the two officers took her to the claim, s.l.’s denial of access claim fails to meet the pleading standard required by access claims “‘into forward-looking and backward-looking access claims is a the supremecourt determined that harburyallegedabackward-lookingclaim we turn next to the question of whether s.l.'s constitutional rights are clearly i concur in parts i, ii, and iv of the court’s opinion. because s.l.’s complaint the dissent argues that s.l. is not entitled to bring a § 1983 action against (citation omitted). circumstances surrounding an improper arrest, mettler, 165 f.3d at 1206, that officer the district court concluded that arnold, lorthridge, isshawn-o'quinn, and harris differs from her proffered facts supporting denial of qualified immunity to harris and as the head of the slmpd internal affairs division, colonel harris received in 2007. he had never returned to missouri after that and had never been employed awidespread pattern of unconstitutionalmisconductbythedepartment,(2)deliberate -18- in a vehicle accident during normal working hours while shopping . . . and improperly access claim itself, in providing relief obtainable in no other suit in the district court denied qualified immunityto the officers responsible for thefalse arrest1 suggested that "intentional" police misconduct "ar[ising] from a conspiracy" would for relief once the frustrating condition has been removed.” id. typical cases include court accepted harbury’s allegation at oral argument that she would have filed a recognizing that claim, is to place the plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim "present at the scene of [s.l.'s] arrest and did not learn of the arrest until two days lorthridge, and, potentially, jonathan. in short, s.l. fails to describe any remedy ____________ -14- -11- the board did not make any findings with respect to colonel harris, the nature the location of the arrest, while arnold's property where it had actually occurred was from a § 1983 action if their conduct did not violate "clearly established statutory or failure to identify any other constitutional injury arising from officer harris’s and s.l., a minor, by next friend ron lenderman it unless harris had leaked the information to arnold. the record also contains some omitted). our review is limited to whether the alleged conduct "violated the alleging that he had participated in the cover up of her unlawful arrest. 2010 for false reporting charges, but her hearing did not take place until august 2011. isshawn-o'quinn,had violated herconstitutionalrights. sheclaimed thatarnold and equal justice" by "conspir[ing] together and with others, including the son of reasoned that the plaintiff’s complaint already included a claim for intentional may yet be brought.” id. at 415. the cost of hiring an attorney arises from the to the subject of an investigation is improper. in a situation where a supervising record viewed in the light most favorable to s.l. would support a conclusion that that will prejudice her cause of action for the unlawful search and seizure. i cannot cir. 2004). in scheeler, the plaintiff stated this element by pleading that the arrest report to escape review by any other supervising officer. if i didn't lie and say that i wasn't arrested at their house." s.l.'s father testified that plaintiff in scheeler, s.l. does not allege that the coverup led to a loss of evidence the court ignores harbury, except to point out that its bifurcation of denial of the district court's denial of summary judgment on s.l.'s municipal liability claims, [her of] her rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the united states from bringing a viable § 1983 action by covering up a false arrest therefore may id. at 414 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). thus, in backward-looking claims, prior to our decision in scheeler, the supreme court explained the allegations denial-of-access claim in harbury. see harbury, 536 u.s. at 421-22. unlike the [plaintiffs’] allegations are true, it is well established that not every violation of state the misconduct alleged by s.l. to show the board's deliberate indifference one week after arnold's first interview with internal investigators, her son slmpd officers and that the board, harris, and isom had failed to supervise arnold, filed: august 5, 2013 just beyond the city limits and outside of slmpd jurisdiction. finally, the report at the present time.” harbury, 536 u.s. at 413. rather, she claims the “loss of an motivate myself like the same way that i used to. i just felt like i was . . . the target were interviewed between august and october of 2010. arnold made several false conspiracy claim, s.l. must show that (1) harris and isshawn-o'quinn conspired to we conclude that the municipal liability claims are not "inextricably it without inquiring into the inconsistencies, thereby preventing any other officers christopher v. harbury, 536 u.s. 403, 415 (2002)). in scheeler, the plaintiffs with the question of qualified immunity, and we lack jurisdiction to consider them at in the wrong name, did not identify the district in which the arrest had occurred, and administrative duty at the time of the arrest and therefore lacked authority to in reviewing the district court's denial of qualified immunity to creative" in repairing deficiencies in her arrest report, and he accepted the revised from the evidence that he and lorthridge had "conspired to conceal arnold's role in shortly after he was interviewed as part of the confidential internal police nance v. sammis, 586 f.3d 604, 609 (8th cir. 2009). constitutional deprivation" or "know[ing]about anyviolation at the time it occurred," separate action against other actors involved in a prior constitutional violation, turn related to harris's acts of providing her with information about the internal infliction of emotional distress. see harbury, 536 u.s. at 409 (describing harbury’s unconstitutional conduct by the slmpd. the board, chief of police isom, and filla . . . should have known that proceeding with a formal complaint would result in assisting officer. after lorthridge implemented his suggestions, isshawn-o'quinn the dissent relies on a pro se case with national security implications,4 deprivation so that a reasonable officer would understand his conduct was unlawful." deprivation of her fourth and fourteenth amendment rights—is the very same could not be obtained on an existing claim.” id. at 420-21. the supreme court finally as to the third element, the record at this stage has support for s.l.'s lieutenant arnold that they arrest her. arnold initially expressed some concern, but 242. there is supporting evidence that harris and isshawn-o'quinn deliberately jonathan visited s.l. at her parents' home to encourage her to change her story to the fromfiling a§ 1983 action following herfalse arrest, which amounted to participation board. nor would a grant of qualified immunity to harris and isshawn-o'quinn a mentor and that he had previously visited her home and kissed her. them qualified immunity because conspiring to cover up an already completed record contains no evidence as to the content of these updates. s.l. alleges, however, after all, no point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting "reasonable inference[]" could be made that confidential information about the officers for arresting her on false charges and conspiring to hide it. she also brought applying harbury to s.l.’s complaint, i conclude that s.l. fails to state a is not the judgment in a further lawsuit, but simply the judgment in the complaint did “not ask[] for any remedy relating to the denial of access to the courts meaningful access to the courts. 402 f.3d 826, 830 (8th cir. 2005) (citing lorthridge's abusive misconduct. in such circumstances s.l. has the right to bring reprehensible, s.l. could seek relief for the injuries jonathan inflicted upon her about the internal investigation into her misconduct. a reasonable factfinder could opportunity to seek some particular order of relief,” id. at 414, by alleging that appeal, which occurs when the resolution of the qualified immunity claim isshawn-o'quinn instructed lorthridge to "becreative"in revising theincident report isshawn-o'quinn participated in a § 1983 conspiracy to violate her constitutional amendment rights "to due process, property, equal protection under the law, and false arrest and detention could be based. front door, but jonathan grabbed her by the hair. s.l. had learned a month earlier that in a bad situation if she's out there taking police actions. i just couldn't do that." -26- indeed,thedenial-of-accessclaimthat thesupremecourt rejected in harbury5 after consulting with others in the department, he filed an employee misconduct of the summons therefore injured s.l. by requiring her to retain defense counsel informed her that she was free to leave. s.l. then told that officer about her arrest cover up the unlawful arrest and detention.” moreover, even the court’s speculative attempt to identify injuries caused by discern how count iv would provide her with a remedy unavailable through the supreme court itself emphasized that "[b]ifurcation into forward-looking and constitutional claim for denial of access because count iv of the complaint does not that harris conspired with arnold to keep her informed of the course of the [internal iv. trespass. one half hour after lorthridge submitted the fifth arrest report, isshawn- exercise of his official duties" but not one who "intentionally abuse[s] a person's officersharrisand isshawn-o’quinn arises fromtheiralleged conspiracy“to deprive officer. speer v. city of wynne, 276 f.3d 980, 986 (8th cir. 2002). failed to include the information that an "assisting officer" had been present during herinformed of the course of the [internal affairs]investigation." the record contains conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy," and (3) s.l. bureau of professional standards,wouldknowthatdivulging confidentialinformation an investigation. rather,isshawn-o'quinninstructed lorthridge to fabricateportions at that hearing the board considered testimony from s.l. and several slmpd -20- complaint failed to identify the underlying cause of action that the alleged deception to violate her constitutional rights in violation of § 1983. to succeed on her § 1983 isshawn-o'quinn conspired with others to conceal facts on which a legal action for defendant arnold, and reach[ing] a mutual understanding to undertake a course of statements during her interview, including denying that her son had been involved harm to [s.l.]." reverse the district court’s holding to the contrary. omitted), and has observed that it was through the enactment of § 1983 that "the role legal redress.’” id. more importantly for our purposes here, even if the supreme injury apart from those compensable in her underlying claims against arnold, he was also never interviewed by the slmpd's internal affairs division of which he change her story one week after arnold was interviewed by investigators. when s.l. after determining that a reasonable jury could find on evidence in the record "that of police; reggie l. harris; lathan isshawn-o'quinn seek “relief obtainable in no other suit in the future.” id. at 414. the remedy s.l. in a § 1983 conspiracy. the record at this stage is sufficient for a reasonable jury to claims is also appealed. the board appeals the district court's denial of summary as to the first element, we agree with the district court that s.l. had a “systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing police station. s.l. testified that during the ride to the station, arnold called her a 515 u.s. at 314. we therefore accept the district court's determination of what facts was injured by that overt act. askew v. millerd, 191 f.3d 953, 957 (8th cir. 1999). has no alternative cause of action against harris and isshawn-o'quinn. for no reason at all. i don't understand, i guess, why all of that happened." such approximately $8,000 of the bills remain unpaid. circumstantial evidence therefore find that harris and isshawn-o'quinn violateds.l.'sclearlyestablishedconstitutional otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” id. at 415. “there is, of the report, resulting in her inserting a false witness, false place of arrest, and false constitutional rights, nance, 586 f.3d at 609. "backward-looking" nor "forward-looking" claim for access to courts. our court has aspect of the first amendment right to petition the government," sure-tan, inc. v. affairs unit. "failed to review the supporting documents to the police report, including the i do not suggest as a general matter that s.l. could not bring a § 1983 action colonel harris, chief of police isom, lieutenant colonel anoinette filla, and the occurred in her home outside slmpd jurisdiction and that the arrestee was the submitted her first report about the arrest the next day. it was rejected without conspiracy." askew, 191 f.3d at 957. isshawn-o'quinn instructed lorthridge to "be prisoners seeking to use a prison’s law library, or “cases challenging filing fees that the ground that s.l. had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the constitution.” s.l., then, does not make a “forward-looking” claim because she does was the head. harris's testimony was not sought until s.l. filed this § 1983 action coerce s.l. to change her story, the record shows that he began pressuring s.l. to evidence that harris and arnold had a close professional relationship, that he had (quoting harbury, 536 u.s. at 414 n.11). this observation by the supreme court diagnosed with a punctured lung, air around the heart, severe bruising, and severe girlfriend, s.l., in his bedroom. she ordered s.l. out of the house and warned her, the record similarlysupports that harris disclosed confidential information to arnold for failure to supervise even without having "personally participated in any when s.l. was unable to find a ride home, officer lorthridge suggested to and i wasn't." related to the structure and decisions of the board itself. s.l. alleges, for example, summons he told her that "it looks like you're going to court, and we're going to need prejudiced her current ability to bring such a suit. simpler case without the denial-of-access element.” id. the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to a. claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “she could not satisfy the lorthridge assured her that an arrest would be lawful because s.l. had been not so indicate. the only constitutional violation the court identifies as involving after s.l.'s parents left for work the following day, jonathan again began meanwhile lieutenant arnold had been suspended without pay in december (8th cir. 1986)). in this case it was particularly important that s.l. be able to pursue no. 12-3193 officers trained in the united states and retained as informants by the central christopher v. harbury, 536 u.s. 403 (2002), arguing that s.l. has stated neither a or hinder an investigation into the underlying misconduct. nor is this a circumstance infliction of emotional distress and that she could seek damages through that cause trespass was set in a new location and an eyewitness was included. the report st. louis metropolitan police department board of police commissioners; lorthridge to deprive s.l. of her valid § 1983 claim. we conclude that it does. as falsified arrest records to protect the department's reputation following arnold and constitutional violation does not violate § 1983. the board, isom, and harris appeal3 fourth amendment claim. it reasoned that he had not participated in the unlawful and that her complaint “did not come even close to stating a constitutional claim for known rights." edwards v. baer, 863 f.2d 606, 607 (8th cir. 1988). a reasonable pressuring her to change her story. she refused, and an argument escalated until to any pattern of false arrests in st. louis. to establish a custom or practice by the at 1008. other evidence in the record also tends to support isshawn-o'quinn's nevertheless, though their actions were “unprofessional, [s.l. has] failed to interview by internal police investigators, and that neither would have known about with respect to municipal liability that a reasonable jury could find on evidence in the harbury, 536 u.s. 403. in harbury, the plaintiff alleged that her husband, a of months later" he had kissed her again at work. there is also evidence that arnold shortly thereafter, captain william swiderski of the eighth district heard "a "white bitch" and stated she would like to "slit [s.l.'s] throat." s.l. also heard seizure . . . in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments”). this is virtually were liable for inadequate supervision. was found "walking in the area . . . appear[ing] to be extremely unke[m]pt, as she was of-access claim. the court states that s.l. suffered injuryfromthe alleged conspiracy constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." harlow v. s.l. called the police, and an ambulance took her to the hospital. there she was confirmed that he had not visited st. louis since his car accident in the city three indifference to that conduct by the board, and (3) that s.l. was injured by the louis metropolitan police department board of police commissioners ("board") on later." the district court also granted summary judgment to lieutenant colonel filla appeal. isshawn-o'quinn and harris argue that the district court erred in denying guatemalan rebel leader, was captured by guatemalan army forces that included lllllllllllllllllllll plaintiff - appellee arnold and lorthridge “subjected [her] to an unlawful and unjustified search and fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 800, 818 (1982). qualified immunity is appropriate only if "no death action . . . against the individual that killed [their son].” id. at 829 (quoting the not allege that “systemic official action frustrates [her] in preparing and filing suits "fundamental right of every citizen," gunter v. morrison, 497 f.3d 868, 874 (8th cir. s.l. indicated that officers harris and isshawn-o’quinn violated a clearly and lorthridge searched in the slmpd computer system for information about shared with arnold. she points to police records showing that lorthridge and arnold ____________ investigators during theinternal affairs investigation. these facts would be sufficient advised lorthridge to remove arnold's name because she had been on limited lorthridge submitted a fifth draft of the arrest report on july 6. it omitted any 242 (1972), and to "deter state actors" such as arnold and lorthridge "from using the the alleged conduct of officers harris and isshawn-o’quinn is inexcusable. v. also engaged in overt acts by submitting the falsified arrest report and misleading the to cover up her arrest because she was required to retain a lawyer to represent her at exercise pendent appeal jurisdiction over such an appeal only in the "exceptional lose her job." according to s.l., she told jonathan, "i'm not going to change the truth future. and beat her. in both cases, s.l. may seek redress for the injury in “some suit that there was "evidence of intentional conduct designed to conceal a violation of [s.l.'s] sue, or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.” id. at 413- s.l. of her valid § 1983 claim.” ante at 12. as discussed above, a denial-of-access had reason to know that their conduct violated s.l.'s constitutional rights. reasonable factfinder" could determine that (1) the facts viewed in the light most within 48 hours of making an arrest. s.l. was arrested on july 3, and lorthridge constitutional rights and . . . influence the outcome of the investigation." it concluded for his advice, and the officer told her that she should raise her concerns at her arrest of s.l. because a seizure is "a single act, and not a continuous fact," citing -16- indicated that s.l. had been arrested for "trespassing on private property" after she louis and was unaware of any slmpd practices or procedures following a false s.l. brought this 42 u.s.c. § 1983 action against several st. louis police we review de novo the district court's denial of qualified immunity to further into arnold's role in the arrest, which would have revealed that the arrest have been made to lieutenant colonel reggie harris, the head of slmpd's internal -19- ranking officer in her own district at that time, s.l. later concluded that the call must harris appeal the denial of summary judgment on s.l.'s inadequate supervision that officers harris and o’quinn violated her constitutional rights. see steidl, 494 f.3d 667, 673 (8th cir. 2007) (citation omitted). with respect to the board and chief isshawn-o'quinn also informed lorthridge that he could not approve the report liable if "the combined actions of multiple officials" created a pattern of iii. in a holding cell for about an hour. when an officer visited the cell to inquire why claims into two categories. id. at 412-14. first are forward-looking claims, in which in reviewing harbury’s claim, the supreme court divided denial-of-access to pursue a civil lawsuit. see 402 f.3d at 829. here, however, s.l. makes no such -17- demonstratethat thatconduct constituted aconstitutionalviolation.” king v.olmsted accepted and approved the fifth incident report without inquiring about the changes to arnold about the ongoing investigation, including informing her when richard defendants appeal. we affirmthe denial of qualified immunity to the two officers and comment by an eighth district sergeant. on july 5 a new sergeant, isshawn-o'quinn, -24- if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any people from unconstitutional action under color of state law." mitchum, 407 u.s. at 609. the record at this stage is sufficient not to dismiss s.l.'s claim that harris and have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently record support a conclusion that the officers violated s.l.'s constitutional rights. see immunity, which is to "excuse an officer who makes a reasonable mistake in the around her heart, and bruising. s.l.'s father testified that her hospital bills from that was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he had "conspired with arnold to keep complaint). we recognized the denial-of-access claimas properlystated but affirmed wyatt v. cole, 504 u.s. 158, 161 (1992).4 claim requires the plaintiff to identify a remedy uniquely available through the claim, investigation in august 2011. s.l. contends that lorthridge and arnold would not arrest allegation. s.l. also need not prove liability of any individual municipal arnold had been placed on limited administrative duty after being "involved2 misconduct of harris and isshawn-o'quinn. the "very purpose of § 1983 [is] to rumor floating around the patrol station" that arnold had arrested her son's girlfriend o’quinn,” ante at 12 n.4, because the dispositive question is whether the remedy involvement in covering up the arrest. it also denied summary judgment to the st. deprive her of a constitutional or federal right, (2) "at least one of the alleged co- turning to the second element, the record also contains evidence that "at least "[i]f somebody doesn't come and get you in five minutes, then i'm going to call your again, s.l.’s complaint contains no allegation that the alleged coverup somehow on an allegation of a cover-up designed to deprive [s.l.] of a valid § 1983 claim" right, and (2) the constitutional right was "clearly established at the time of the fortrespassing. he reviewed the fifth draft of lorthridge's incident reportand noticed ii. s.l. had provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find that isshawn-o'quinn and -6- of 'fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme' because they directly urging us to exercise pendent jurisdiction over these issues because they are our conclusion is also consistent with the "obvious function" of qualified lorthridge, and isshawn-o'quinn adequately. that it did not mention arnold's involvement. the captain also found it problematic a remedy that is unavailable in a current or future lawsuit. see id. at 415; see also emotional distress. executed by order of the cia-affiliated officers. id. according to harbury’s "necessarily resolve[]" s.l.'s claim that the board, isom, and harris failed to was assigned to the eighth district. lorthridge gave him a second draft of the arrest the district court granted summary judgment to isshawn-o'quinn on s.l.'s s.l. suffered injury from the alleged coverup when arnold’s son jonathan choked established such that harris and isshawn-o'quinn would understand that their ____________ seeks through count iv—damages and other appropriate relief resulting from a act of filing the false police report and isshawn-o'quinn's act of approving it. officer has "intentional[ly]" aided a subordinate office in concealing the afraid of police officers" and that when she encounters one she "get[s] really, really documenting s.l.'s arrest. afterlorthridge resubmittedarevised report,he approved slmpd board of police commissioners, chief of police isom, and colonel harris “unconstitutional action under color of state law” that is required to survive summary denial of access upon which relief could be granted.” id. at 418. it reasoned that “the prosecution of count i. affairs investigation so she could protect her own interests. indifferent to pervasive unlawful arrests and false reporting in the slmpd, and that report that morning and told him that it "need[ed] to be looked at." allegation. unobtainable. the ultimate object of these sorts of access claims, then, upset and cr[ies]." she also stated, "i'm just depressed and don't feel that i can municipalliabilityclaims fordeliberateindifference and inadequate supervision. the deposition testimony establishes that his approval was sufficient for the falsified officers. the board then determined that arnold had participated in the arrest of s.l. periodic updates on the investigation involving lieutenant henrietta arnold. the poor plaintiffs cannot afford to pay.” id. second are “backward-looking” claims, in isshawn-o'quinn rejected lorthridge's second report based on several isshawn-o'quinn received a one day suspension and a written reprimand from the ___________________________ of the report, the victim of the trespass was riverway development, llc, which was that in august 2009 harris had visited her home and kissed her, and that "[a] couple participate in s.l.'s arrest. he explained to lorthridge, "that puts the department2 appeal we review only questions of law and not "a district court's determination that board were liable for inadequate supervision of lorthridge, arnold, and without a named witness to the arrest. he instructed her to look in the slmpd ____________________________ that he [could not] ‘still . . . obtain [] through another procedure’” (quoting harbury, -21- underlying violation—afailure to investigate—deprived themof theevidenceneeded regarding herhusband’s whereabouts, preventing her fromfiling alawsuit against the identify a “remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available consider them at this stage. id. granting qualified immunity to harris and we conclude that the material facts identified by the district court and the thompson v. whitman, 85 u.s. 457, 471 (1873), and isshawn-o'quinn had not been cnty., 117 f.3d 1065, 1068 (8th cir. 1997); see also rubek v. barnhart, 814 f.2d ____________ of the federal government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power the question before the court. see johnson v. jones, 515 u.s. 304, 314 (1995). department's computer system. he also instructed her to remove arnold's name as in count iv of s.l.’s amended complaint, she alleges that arnold, lorthridge, lorthridge do not appeal the district court's denial of qualified immunity as to them. false arrest and then "knowingly allowed the matter to be assigned [to] the internal to make the required showing that the defendants displayed “deliberate indifference conduct was unlawful. the supreme court has long held that "civil rights actions are computer system because he had been involved in a minor car accident in st. louis officer harris, and officer isshawn-o’quinn conspired to “violate [her] civil rights information and concealment foreclosed plaintiff from effectively seeking adequate the alleged conspiracy fails to identify a unique remedy that could support a denial- isshawn-o'quinn. the deliberate indifference claim relies largely on allegations backward to a time when specific litigation ended poorly, or could not decision." krout v. goemmer, 583 f.3d 557, 563–64 (8th cir. 2009). we will that harris received confidential information about the investigation which he then u.s. at 417-18 (footnote omitted). whether or not we call it a backward-looking arising from arnold and lorthridge's misconduct. the district court concluded that antoinette filla; henrietta arnold he overheard that conversation between jonathan and s.l. and that jonathan had appear in court on trespassing charges on september 1, 2012. she was then placed 2007) (citation omitted). individuals who have been falsely arrested are therefore officer lorthridge voluntarily resigned from the slmpd. at isshawn-o'quinn's interviewed richard delaney, the alleged witness and resident of indiana, who but it was no longer in operation there at the time of s.l.'s arrest. had conspired to cover up a false arrest in violation of § 1983. she claimed that assisting officer and included false statements about the fabricated offense. s.l.'s rights, and the district court accordingly did not err in denying qualified immunity to circumstance" in which it is "inextricably intertwined" with the qualified immunity arrest had occurred on the vacant lot neighboring her property. police also incident report without inquiring as to its striking inconsistencies with previous board of ignoring false arrests by the slmpd, s.l. must show (1) the existence of and s.l.’s allegations in that regard are insufficient. this fact, combined with her f.3d at 633 (reversing the denial of qualified immunity on a denial-of-access claim slmpd procedures require an arresting officer to submit an incident report granting qualified immunity to harris also would not resolve s.l.'s failure to using a st. louis metropolitan police department vehicle." officers harris and isshawn o’quinn conspired to “creat[e] a false police report to have searched for delaney's name unless they had been informed about his recent report and commenced an internal affairs investigation. arnold, lorthridge, and s.l. before murphy, smith, and gruender, circuit judges. adequately. according to the board, isshawn-o'quinn should also have inquired action rather than appearing for the scheduled hearing. isshawn-o'quinn's approval 117-18 (d.c. cir. 2006); jennings v. city of stillwater, 383 f.3d 1199, 1207-09 (10th isshawn-o'quinn. according to s.l., lieutenant colonel filla had learned of her with s.l., stating that she had not participated in s.l.'s arrest, and insisting that the (in part). grounds. the board, harris, isom, and filla also moved for summary judgment on evidence could support a finding that s.l. was injured as a result of lorthridge's overt of a claim against those officers. if the record viewed in the light most favorable to remedy she seeks through count i. compare compl. ¶ 73 (alleging that the officers in their official capacities. she claimed that the board had been deliberately was directed at different defendants than the underlying claim for intentional during the july 3, 2010 workday officer lorthridge drove lieutenant arnold home backward-looking access claims is a simplification," rather than "the only possible was clearly established," mitchum, 407 u.s. at 238–39. our court has similarly denial-of-access counts as naming national security council and state department inserted the name of richard delaney, termed a riverway development employee, -25- as a witness to the trespass. delaney was an indiana resident whose name had been favorable to the plaintiff show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional from scrutinizing its content. the record at this stage similarly supports an inference that lieutenant isshawn-o'quinn had participated in the violation by suggesting and ___________________________ evidence of a close relationship between colonel harris and lieutenant arnold, richard gray, vice president; bettye battle-turner, president; michael l. violation.” ante at 15. the problem is that she fails to plead the necessary elements reasonable person would have known," harlow, 457 u.s. at 818, but he may be liable [to] or tacit authorization of the offensive acts." brockinton v. city of sherwood, 503


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