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Hollywood Mobile Estate Limited v Seminole Tribe of Florida

Case No. 09-15336 (C.A. 11, May. 23, 2011)

This appeal presents issues of constitutional and prudential standing. The issue of constitutional standing is whether Hollywood Mobile Estates Limited alleged an injury fairly traceable to the Secretary of the Interior or redressable by the district court in a complaint that alleged that the Seminole Tribe of Florida had threatened to repossess tribal property in violation of a lease between Hollywood and the Tribe. After the Tribe repossessed the leased property, the district court denied, as futile, the motion of Hollywood for leave to amend the complaint to request injunctive relief against the Secretary under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. That decision raises an issue of prudential standing: whether the interests of Hollywood are within the zone of interests protected by the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415, and its accompanying regulations. Because we conclude that Hollywood lacked constitutional standing to maintain its complaint, we vacate in part the judgment entered by the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because we also conclude that Hollywood lacked prudential standing to sue the Secretary, we affirm the denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 11, 1969, the Seminole Tribe of Florida agreed to lease lands located within the Seminole Indian Reservation in Broward County, Florida, to Joseph L. Antonucci. The Secretary of the Interior approved the lease. The lease allowed use of the reservation property as a mobile home park with appurtenant commercial facilities, community services, and amenities for the residents. The lease provided that rent would be based either on the lessee’s income from the leased property or a minimum annual amount. The lease required the lessee to provide certified statements of gross receipts each year to assist in rent calculations.

Antonucci and the Tribe first agreed to a term of 50 years for the lease and later extended that term to 55 years. The lease will expire in 2024. The lease has been modified on several occasions, each time with the Secretary’s approval. In 1970, Antonucci assigned the lease to ESCOM Enterprises, and in 1975, ESCOM assigned the lease to De Anza Properties.

In 1986, De Anza Properties assigned the lease to Hollywood Mobile Estates Limited, a Michigan limited partnership. The Tribe and the Secretary approved the assignment and agreed to a related estoppel agreement at the request of Hollywood. The estoppel agreement provided that a certified public accountant in Michigan would prepare the financial statements of Hollywood, allowed encumbrance of the leased property, and provided that the lease had no uncured default at the time of the assignment. In reliance on the estoppel agreement, Hollywood paid the Tribe $400,000. Hollywood also agreed to pay 15 percent of its gross income from the leased property to the Tribe as rent.
 

 

Judge(s): William Pryor
Jurisdiction: U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Related Categories: Civil Procedure , Civil Remedies , Constitutional Law , Government / Politics , Property
 
Circuit Court Judge(s)
J.L. Edmondson
Orinda Evans
William Pryor

 

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motion of hollywood for leave to file an amended complaint, but hollywood lacked that addresses the secretary's enforcement authority, for example, provides, "we the supreme court has construed a request for a writ of mandamus against request injunctive relief against the secretary under the administrative procedure conduct complained of--the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged 554 f.3d 1340, 1349 (11th cir. 2009). "we review the denial of a motion to amend our decision in doe v. pryor, where we held that a plaintiff's injuries were protected by section 415 and its accompanying regulations. leased property to its best use. the letter also stated that the tribe might repossess hollywood mobile estates limited, secured the note, a collateral assignment of rents and profits, and related financing not arguably within the zone of interests protected by the indian long-term a trespasser on tribal land, hollywood would still not fall within the zone of lease between hollywood and the tribe. both hollywood and the tribe, he denied the request to cancel the lease. keel act, 25 u.s.c. 415, and its accompanying regulations, which govern the lease tribe appealed keel's decision to the interior board of indian appeals. that the leased property. on july 3, 2008, hollywood responded with a letter to the protected by the indian long-term leasing act, which allows "[a]ny restricted of the plaintiffs alleged that she had lost a custody dispute in a state court, which action of the secretary that had caused hollywood any injury. hollywood instead the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question," acts as a fiduciary with respect to indian property." saguaro chevrolet, inc. v. bank added no new allegation of injury fairly traceable to the secretary or in the united states court of appeals ________________________ injunction under the administrative procedure act. our conclusion that hollywood lacks prudential standing does not mean that lessees supplemental complaint. hollywood later filed a revised version of its amended tribe resort[ed] to self-help and reenter[ed] . . . the property." hollywood alleged interior, indian lands, id. 162.102(c), 162.107(a), 162.108(b). the regulation that mulhall v. unite here local 355, 618 f.3d 1279, 1290 (11th cir. 2010) florida or california, encumbranced the leased property, and failed to put the establish that the secretary had a nondiscretionary duty to remove the tribe from 755 f.2d at 1414. hollywood failed to satisfy this burden because it did not allege 162.105(a), 162.107(a), 162.108(b), 162.604(b)(3) and (d), 162.617(a), 162.620(b); hollywood also argues that the secretary's authority to enforce leases lease in its favor because the secretary represented to the district court that, if an although the district court later allowed lasalle bank to intervene, lasalle court and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within addresses the "responsibilities" of the bureau "in administering and enforcing 162.108(a); to protect the interests of indian landowners, id. 162.102(c), regulations did not provide a remedy for the lessee). section 415 and its but the secretary's bare statement to the district court proves nothing. the plaintiff." 28 u.s.c. 1361. a district court may grant a petition for a writ of ct. at 2136; see also dermer v. miami-dade cnty., 599 f.3d 1217, 1220 (11th cir. failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to join the tribe as an sought to prohibit the tribe from using self-help to evict hollywood from the secretary offered no explanation of this supposed authority to enforce the lease in owners, with the approval of the secretary of the interior, for public, religious, the exercise of any negotiated remedies that apply in addition to pryor, circuit judge: in 1986, de anza properties assigned the lease to hollywood mobile estates landowners, id. 162.106(a), 162.108(b), 162.623; and to preserve the value of eleventh circuit hollywood from the leased property, despite keel's determination that hollywood that official had caused those injuries, 344 f.3d 1282, 1285 (11th cir. 2003), is democratic nat'l comm., 520 f.3d 1299, 1301 (11th cir. 2008) (quoting elend v. the administrative procedure act waives the sovereign immunity of the procedure 24(c). that failure means that lasalle bank also did not establish minimum" of standing under article iii consists of three elements: an actual or seminole tribe of florida, action. the tribe acted unilaterally against hollywood. landowners." id. 162.106(a), 162.623. even if we were to describe the tribe as 13 default at the time of the assignment. in reliance on the estoppel agreement, venue act, 28 u.s.c. 1361, as authorities for granting relief in the amended not fairly traceable to a public official because the plaintiff had failed to allege how bank appealed the dismissal of the complaint, the denial of leave to amend, and the and enjoin any reentry and/or retaking of the leased premises." the complaint plaintiff-appellant, proposed complaint cites the administrative procedure act and seeks to "[c]ompel which relief can be granted. the district court construed the complaint as a may 23, 2011 land lacked standing to sue the secretary of the interior under section 415 because court should have dismissed the complaint of hollywood for lack of subject matter regulations. must examine the complaint filed by hollywood to determine whether it pleaded for administering the actions taken by the department of the interior." the complaint. in a related motion, hollywood explained that it sought "an injunction landowners and the prompt initiation of appropriate collection and interior board of indian appeals will affirm that determination is uncertain, as the when construed as a complaint under the administrative procedure act, the hollywood relies on yavapai-prescott indian tribe v. watt, 707 f.2d 1072 hollywood lacks prudential standing. 25 basham, 471 f.3d 1199, 1206 (11th cir. 2006)). educational, recreational, residential, or business purposes." 25 u.s.c. 415(a). preserve the value of the land. futile because hollywood lacked prudential standing; the interests of hollywood are indian appeals had reinstated a lease that the tribe had unilaterally terminated. the both parties to the lease, but the texts of those laws say otherwise. the regulation 25 c.f.r. 162.108. the eighth circuit has held that a nontribal lessee of indian ii. standard of review land do not arguably fall within the zone of interests protected by section 415 and forms of relief is irrelevant to our holding that hollywood lacks prudential standing u.s. 602, 616, 104 s. ct. 2013, 2022 (1984); lifestar ambulance serv., inc. v. [publish] denial of reconsideration, and we directed the parties to be prepared to discuss at john ley could have done to prevent the tribe from repossessing the leased property or cite action in question are among them. united states department of the interior, procedure act means that the "grant of a writ of mandamus would be improper." matter jurisdiction. has already determined that hollywood did not breach the lease. whether the that the secretary had caused hollywood any injury. for that reason, the district allege that its injury was redressable by the district court. the element of hollywood had leased. the tribe later carried out its threat by forcibly evicting the secretary's approval of leases of indian land "is consistent with the long- intended to benefit the plaintiff. instead, we first discern the interests 1970, antonucci assigned the lease to escom enterprises, and in 1975, escom and internal quotation marks omitted). hollywood named the secretary as a amended complaint is futile because hollywood lacks prudential standing. the regulations. because we conclude that hollywood lacked constitutional standing congress intended section 415 "to protect indian tribes and their members." san 20 based on the approach of the supreme court in japan whaling, the amended (a) we will ensure that tenants meet their payment obligations to lease. to secure the loan, hollywood executed and delivered to michigan national possession of the leasehold premises." hollywood now argues that the amended controversy requirement of article iii." lujan v. defenders of wildlife, 504 u.s. inc., 543 f.3d 1247, 1250 (11th cir. 2008). indispensable party. hollywood then moved for leave to file an amended and from the record whether the relief requested is likely to redress the alleged injury," s. ct. 927, 935 (1998). under this test, we must examine the indian long-term concluded that the availability of injunctive relief under the administrative the regulations that address the secretary's enforcement authority over trespassers accompanying regulations protect indian landowners, not nontribal lessees. jurisdiction. (11th cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). this appeal presents issues of constitutional and prudential standing. the resolve a dispute about the lease. the complaint also alleged that hollywood amended complaint before we address its futility. hollywood cited both the its initial complaint, failed to allege constitutional standing to sue the secretary. through appropriate inspections and enforcement actions as needed to protect the pt. 162. subpart a, id. 162.100162.113, and subpart f, id. provides that "[t]he form of proceeding for judicial review" may "includ[e] . . . [a] 1985). "the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the [administrative procedure act]." id. at 507 n.6. the third circuit similarly leave to amend the complaint. mandatory injunction . . . in a court of competent jurisdiction." id. 703. the act for the southern district of florida empower the secretary to enforce a lease of indian land for the mutual benefit of enforce leases is not for the mutual benefit of both parties; the regulation empowers disputes with indian tribes because of tribal sovereign immunity. see, e.g., kiowa 23 before edmondson and pryor, circuit judges, and evans, district judge.* "arguably . . . to be protected" by the statutory provision at issue; we "we review issues of standing de novo." common cause/ga. v. billups, 15 appellant, arguably protected by the relevant statute: allen v. wright, 468 u.s. 737, 752, 104 s. ct. 3315, 3325 (1984). "`[w]e should availability of relief under the administrative procedure act also forecloses a grant holdings of our sister circuits in rosebud sioux tribe v. mcdivitt, 286 f.3d 1031 district court should have dismissed the complaint of hollywood for lack of subject auth., 344 f.3d 1263, 1275 (11th cir. 2003), and "the standing inquiry requires of tribal lands have no remedy whatsoever. lessees may potentially obtain 4 mandamus if the defendant owes the plaintiff a "clear nondiscretionary duty" and 24 affects hollywood . . . in ways that are irreparable." lasalle bank did not file a any authority that empowered the secretary to act for the benefit of hollywood. "it (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). we must be able "to ascertain the same is true of the corresponding regulations, which charge the bureau u.s. court of appeals united states, 77 fed. cl. 572, 57778 (2007). that fiduciary relationship requires that the challenged statute was no longer enforceable, doe, 344 f.3d at 1283. we specific remedies made available to us under these or other hollywood. the estoppel agreement provided that a certified public accountant in versus 12 congress intended section 415 "to protect only native american interests," denied, as futile, the motion of hollywood for leave to amend the complaint to case--only an injunction to compel the secretary to enforce the lease by placing to maintain its complaint, we vacate in part the judgment entered by the district administrative appeal filed by the tribe remains pending, but the outcome of that georgia, sitting by designation. of a writ of mandamus. arguably protect and then determine whether the interests of hollywood are among "article iii standing must be determined as of the time at which the had threatened to do so. leasing act, 25 u.s.c. 415, and its accompanying regulations, which govern the 162.600162.623, regulate non-agricultural leases. the bureau promulgated these fla. evergreen foliage v. e.i. dupont de nemours & co., 470 f.3d 1036, 1040 held that the plaintiff who had lost the custody dispute lacked standing because her favor of hollywood. before this court, the secretary instead contends, and we employee of the united states or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the procedure act, 5 u.s.c. 551 et seq., as authorities for granting relief. in a related after hollywood filed its complaint, the tribe initiated an administrative instructive. in doe, several plaintiffs filed suit against the attorney general of administrative appeal is still pending. obligated to address jurisdictional questions sua sponte." frulla v. cra holdings, that its injury was fairly traceable to the secretary. the causation element of or a preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin any reentry and/or retaking of the secretary of the interior. the complaint described the secretary as "the approving authority is not in dispute here. it is undisputed that an appointee of the secretary a complaint for an abuse of discretion," but "when the district court denies the limited, a michigan limited partnership. the tribe and the secretary approved the possession of the leased property, collected rental income from the mobile home only defendant in this case is the alabama attorney general, and the only injuries 1190, 1196 n.5 (ala. 1998). after the supreme court decided lawrence v. texas, (8th cir. 2002), and san xavier development authority v. charles, 237 f.3d 1149 concluding that as a matter of law an amended complaint would necessarily fail." the same" under either approach. independence mining co. v. babbitt, 105 f.3d hollywood also filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction that stated that he had determined that hollywood had not breached the lease. the hollywood contends that the district court erred when it denied, as futile, the action that it is required to take." norton v. s. utah wilderness alliance, 542 u.s. affirm the denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile. even if for the wrong reason. the mandamus and venue act, 28 u.s.c. 1361, and the administrative in his official capacity as secretary of the petition for a writ of mandamus and determined that hollywood had failed to the supreme court has explained that the "irreducible constitutional whether the interests of hollywood are within the zone of interests protected by the article iii of the united states constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal indian landowners, through the collection of rent on behalf of the original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or administrative procedure act, we ask, as part of our review of prudential standing, also provides that "the reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully proceeding and requested that franklin keel, eastern region director of the interests of hollywood are not arguably within the zone of interests protected by the the tribe notified hollywood of several alleged defaults on the lease. the tribe defendants-appellees. protected interests because the regulations empower the secretary to eject issue of constitutional standing is whether hollywood mobile estates limited 2 hollywood moved to dismiss the tribe after it asserted sovereign immunity, "ha[d] a good faith belief and concern that the tribe [would] resort to self help and injunction against the secretary under the administrative procedure act. the regulations. hollywood alleged an imminent injury. the injury-in-fact element requires provide certified statements of gross receipts each year to assist in rent on march 11, 1969, the seminole tribe of florida agreed to lease lands 613, 61415 (9th cir. 1980). careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the complaint is divided in two parts. first, we explain that the amended complaint administrative processes. whether hollywood can now pursue these alternative no. 09-15336 investigation revealed that hollywood had not breached the lease, "the bureau 555, 560, 112 s. ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). standing "determin[es] the power of the plaintiff leave to amend due to futility, we review the denial de novo because it is 17 the mandamus and venue act provides, "the district courts shall have should have withheld its decision until the completion of the administrative appeal injuries were not fairly traceable to any alleged act of the attorney general: "the involvement of the secretary in lease cancellations, id. at 107576, but that grant of complaint sought a mandatory injunction against the secretary, not a writ of our discussion of the denial of the motion for leave to file an amended empower him to "take action to recover possession on behalf of the indian tribe of okla. v. mfg. techs., inc., 523 u.s. 751, 118 s. ct. 1700 (1998). second, reenter and retake the leased premises" because the tribe had previously utilized although hollywood alleged an imminent injury, hollywood failed to allege lease provided that rent would be based either on the lessee's income from the article iii standing requires "a causal connection between the injury and the 502, 507 (9th cir. 1997). the ninth circuit also "question[ed] the [availability] of iii. discussion indian lands, whether tribally, or individually owned, [to] be leased by the indian appeals from the united states district court motion, hollywood alleged that "[m]oney damages are not sought in this and the district court granted that motion. the district court also granted the prescott, an indian tribe sought relief in a district court after the interior board of district court decided the emergency motion. the tribe has since remained in lease with hollywood. antonucci and the tribe first agreed to a term of 50 years for the lease and [hollywood] back in possession of the property constitute[d] ultra vires actions and standing." bischoff v. osceola cnty., fla., 222 f.3d 874, 878 (11th cir. 2000). we we must determine the nature of the relief requested by hollywood in the jurisdiction. because we also conclude that hollywood lacked prudential standing accountant in michigan to prepare financial statements instead of an accountant in complaint was futile because it sought the same relief. [the secretary and keel] to enforce the [l]ease and the applicable federal law by lasalle bank midwest national the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." lujan, 504 u.s. at 561, 112 "in addition to the immutable requirements of article iii, the federal intervenor-plaintiff of agency action" to "seek[] relief other than money damages" in federal court. 5 procedure act, japan whaling ass'n v. am. cetacean soc'y, 478 u.s. 221, 230 regulations for several purposes: to assist indian landowners, id. 162.107(a), supp. 2d 1279, 128384 (d. utah 1999). enforcement of payment obligations that run directly to them, and in 22 motion for leave to amend or otherwise join the motion of hollywood. 7 hollywood moved for reconsideration on the ground that the district court standing relationship between indians and the government in which the government the federal government to act for the benefit of indian landowners because threatened to repossess tribal property in violation of a lease between hollywood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered." the same is true here. hollywood alleged an imminent injury related to the sue under 25 u.s.c. 416, a related statute that governs leases of land located 1. the amended complaint should be construed as a request for a mandatory injunction against the secretary under the administrative procedure act, 5 u.s.c. redressability requires that "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that leasing act and its accompanying regulations to determine the interests they iv. conclusion landowners and respond to concerns expressed by them. we will take ct. at 2022; cash v. barnhart, 327 f.3d 1252, 1258 (11th cir. 2003). united states to the extent that it permits "[a] person suffering legal wrong because dispute with the tribe about the lease until 2008. in a letter dated june 17, 2008, association acquired the interest in the mortgage. in 2008, bank of america second, we explain that the district court did not err when it denied the motion of sought to enjoin the tribe from repossessing the leased property because the tribe between hollywood and the tribe. the district court reached the correct result, defendant and described some responsibilities of his office, but failed to allege an we divide our discussion in two parts. first, we explain that hollywood, in had cited the challenged statute in its decision. see ex parte j.m.f., 730 so. 2d 14 enforcement actions. we will also assist landowners in the to sue the secretary, we affirm the denial of the motion for leave to amend the party not before the court." lujan, 504 u.s. at 560, 112 s. ct. at 2136 (alterations 539 u.s. 558, 123 s. ct. 2472 (2003), the attorney general of alabama conceded (9th cir. 2001). defendant, hollywood paid the tribe $400,000. hollywood also agreed to pay 15 percent of the secretary moved to dismiss the complaint based on sovereign immunity, oral argument whether they had standing to sue the secretary in the light of the prevailing on the merits. ass'n of data processing serv. orgs. v. camp, 397 u.s. 150, 15354, 90 s. ct. steele, 755 f.2d at 1415, and if we cannot, then we do not have jurisdiction to b. the district court did not err when it denied hollywood proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency hollywood . . . back into possession of the leasehold premises." hollywood assignment and agreed to a related estoppel agreement at the request of united states, 365 f.3d 1293, 1295 (11th cir. 2004). a writ of mandamus will not of standing," bennett v. spear, 520 u.s. 154, 162, 117 s. ct. 1154, 1161 (1997) when a favorable decision would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood d. c. docket no. 08-61048-cv-wpd allowed use of the reservation property as a mobile home park with appurtenant complaint alleged that the secretary had approved and ratified the lease and that rosebud sioux tribe, 286 f.3d at 103637, and we agree. see also san xavier tribe that denied any default or breach and demanded arbitration of the dispute. s. ct. at 2136 (internal quotation marks omitted). "redressability is established 3 leased property or a minimum annual amount. the lease required the lessee to is the plaintiff's burden to plead and prove . . . redressability," steele, 755 f.2d at bureau of indian affairs, cancel the lease. after keel received submissions from these three elements. contractual waivers of sovereign immunity or seek relief in tribal courts or constitute[d] final agency action causing irreparable harm." hollywood cited both 560, 112 s. ct. at 2136 (footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third 2205 (1975). "in the absence of standing, a court is not free to opine in an leases" provides that the bureau acts to protect the interests of indian tribes: to continue." camp legal def. fund, inc. v. city of atlanta, 451 f.3d 1257, 1269 prudential standing to maintain that complaint. the interests of hollywood are not complaint in which it alleged that the "refusal and failure of the [secretary and that the tribe had previously resorted to self-help to repossess other property filed by the tribe. the district court denied that motion. hollywood and lasalle pleading in intervention to its motion as required by federal rule of civil definitive position that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; an injury that directly alabama to enjoin enforcement of a statute that made "deviate sexual intercourse" court did not err when it denied the motion of hollywood for leave to amend the resort[ed] to self-help and reenter[ed] . . . the property" and requested the district keel] to enforce the lease, preserve the property interests of [hollywood] and place 2. the proposed amendment of the complaint of hollywood was futile because 21 regulations again fails to support this argument. the regulations define "[t]respass" advisory capacity about the merits of a plaintiff's claims, and the court is powerless to compel the secretary to enforce the lease by placing hollywood . . . back into enacting the statutory provision at issue, congress specifically hollywood is not an indian landowner, its interests as a nontribal lessee of indian 827, 830 (1970). the supreme court has explained that our inquiry is not so the mandamus and venue act and the administrative procedure act as a complaint proposed by hollywood should be construed as a request for a mandatory particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted," its accompanying regulations. n.4, 106 s. ct. 2860, 2866 n.4 (1986), and its decision is instructive. based on that restoring [hollywood] to full possession of the leasehold premises." the a. hollywood failed to allege constitutional standing to sue the secretary. administrative procedure act, 5 u.s.c. 551 et seq., and the mandamus and plaintiff's complaint is filed," focus on the family v. pinellas suncoast transit honorable orinda d. evans, united states district judge for the northern district of* `challenged action.'" id. at 1285. see also s. pac. transp. co. v. brown, 651 f.2d (b) we will ensure that tenants comply with the operating the plaintiff has "exhausted all other avenues of relief." heckler v. ringer, 466 the district court denied the motion of hollywood for leave to amend the 2010); steele v. nat'l firearms act branch, 755 f.2d 1410, 141314 (11th cir. statements. after a series of acquisitions, lasalle bank midwest national the secretary to enforce leases only for the benefit of indian landowners. because 19 i. background park residents each month, and refused to remit this rental income to hollywood or association, self-help to repossess a water and sewer treatment facility in violation of a separate 55, 64, 124 s. ct. 2373, 2379 (2004) (alteration in original). for the eleventh circuit alleged an injury fairly traceable to the secretary of the interior or redressable by clerk contended that hollywood had breached the lease when hollywood used an 551 et seq. second, we explain that the proposed amendment of the complaint was 10 was futile for lack of prudential standing. and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." lujan, 504 u.s. at lasalle bank. the district court denied the emergency motion of hollywood on the secretary of commerce as a complaint under section 706 of the administrative there be no remedy for a wrongful eviction by the tribe, but this argument fails for assigned the lease to de anza properties. and the tribe. after the tribe repossessed the leased property, the district court component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or- interest, [the secretary and keel] have arrived at an immediately effective been modified on several occasions, each time with the secretary's approval. in includes the authority to eject a trespassing tribe, but the plain language of the hollywood managed a mobile home park on the leased property and had no within the san xavier indian reservation, because the statute and accompanying calculations. of standing because it did not "suggest in any way how [the] `injury' could be we vacate in part the judgment of the district court and remand request of lasalle bank to intervene as a plaintiff. _________________________ 9 its gross income from the leased property to the tribe as rent. decision, the ninth circuit construed a complaint that requested relief under both hollywood for leave to amend the complaint because the proposed amendment immediate action to recover possession from trespassers operating requirements in their leases, through appropriate inspections and hollywood finally contends that the secretary has the authority to enforce the u.s.c. 702. "agency action" includes "failure to act." id. 551(13). the act 6 to create jurisdiction by embellishing a deficient allegation of injury.'" dimaio v. mandamus. the secretary contends that a writ of mandamus is the only possible court to "enter a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction to restrain trespassers for the benefit of only indian landowners. a criminal offense, ala. code 13a-6-65(a)(3). doe, 344 f.3d at 128384. one filed complaint as futile. withheld or unreasonably delayed." id. 706. "[a] claim under 706(1) can the district court in a complaint that alleged that the seminole tribe of florida had be granted if alternative remedies are available. heckler, 466 u.s. at 616, 104 s. ninth circuit held that section 415 and its accompanying regulations require the entertain the appeal. see dimaio, 520 f.3d at 1303 (dismissing complaint for lack later extended that term to 55 years. the lease will expire in 2024. the lease has judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question 1414, and hollywood failed to satisfy this burden. for this additional reason, the 11 redressed by a favorable judgment"). hollywood failed to allege what the secretary would be prepared to use its authority to return the parties to the status quo ante," even apart from its failure to allege causation, hollywood also failed to michigan national bank-oakland loaned hollywood funds to acquire the hollywood alleged that it was "threatened with irreparable injury if the tribe dev. auth., 237 f.3d at 1153 (lessee of indian land lacked prudential standing to as "an unauthorized possession, occupancy, or use of indian land." id. 162.101. constitutional standing to sue the secretary. attorney general played no role. the attorney general has taken no . . . and indispensable party pursuant to the lease" who had "the overall responsibility then inquire whether the plaintiff's interests affected by the agency 8 ________________________ (may 23, 2011) leased property. the tribe nonetheless forcibly evicted hollywood before the acquired lasalle bank and became the successor in interest to the mortgage. the lease required arbitration if hollywood, the tribe, and the secretary could not indian long-term leasing act, 25 u.s.c. 415, and its accompanying stehney v. perry, 101 f.3d 925, 934 (3d cir. 1996). xavier dev. auth., 237 f.3d at 1153; see also utah v. u.s. dep't of interior, 45 f. argued that "by refusing to enforce the lease and immediately return the possessory (9th cir. 1983), but that decision lends no support to its argument. in yavapai- not speculate concerning the existence of standing'" because we "`lack[] the power arguably within the zone of interests protected by the indian long-term leasing hon. ken salazar, will ensure that tenants comply with the operating requirements in their leases, redressable by the district court. in fact, lasalle bank failed to attach a copy of its 5 (internal quotation marks omitted), and when a party requests relief under the to enable the bureau to take action to recover possession on behalf of the indian "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, 16 courts to "cases" and "controversies," u.s. const. art. iii, 2, and "the core michigan would prepare the financial statements of hollywood, allowed hollywood argues that section 415 and its accompanying regulations "it is the plaintiff's burden to plead and prove . . . causation . . . ." steele, imminent injury, causation, and redressability. lujan, 504 u.s. at 56061, 112 s. without a lease, and take other emergency action as needed to agree, that the interests of hollywood do not fall within the zone of interests hollywood filed a complaint in the district court on july 8, 2008. named as defendants the tribe and dirk kempthorne in his official capacity as hollywood argues that it must be able to seek relief against the secretary, lest located within the seminole indian reservation in broward county, florida, to nat'l credit union admin. v. first nat'l bank & trust co., 522 u.s. 479, 492, 118 those arguably protected interests. encumbrance of the leased property, and provided that the lease had no uncured court to entertain the suit." warth v. seldin, 422 u.s. 490, 498, 95 s. ct. 2197, the leased property. the court concluded that the proposed amendment to the indian long-term leasing act and its accompanying regulations. the district interests of the indian landowners." 25 c.f.r. 162.108(b). this authority to had not breached the lease, and by collecting rent that otherwise would have been remedy. demanding as to deny potential relief to a person whose interests are, at least, hollywood satisfied this requirement when it sought "a temporary restraining order ________________________ the interests of hollywood are not arguably within the zone of interests bank various loan documents, including a promissory note, a mortgage that under the administrative procedure act because "the relief sought [was] essentially complaint. commercial facilities, community services, and amenities for the residents. the [the plaintiff] has alleged stem from a state court custody proceeding in which the complaint and dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon 18 of indian affairs with regulating leases under section 415. see generally 25 c.f.r. the traditional mandamus remedy . . . where there [was] an adequate remedy under a michigan limited partnership, [i]n applying the "zone of interests" test, we do not ask whether, in the ground that tribal sovereign immunity would likely prevent hollywood from complaint proposed by hollywood is best construed as a request for a mandatory administrative appeal does not affect our analysis. act, 5 u.s.c. 551 et seq. that decision raises an issue of prudential standing: with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we to seek relief against the secretary under section 415 and its accompanying two reasons. first, a judicial remedy is often unavailable for contractors who have leased premises" because hollywood was "threatened with irreparable injury if the leased property: that is, a forcible eviction. but the secretary played no role in that (11th cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "we are paid to hollywood. enforcement actions as needed to protect the interests of the indian joseph l. antonucci. the secretary of the interior approved the lease. the lease


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